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I. INTRODUCTION
Among the compelling aspects of the Independent Counsel's investigation
of President Clinton's tawdry conduct was his appearance before a federal
grand jury and the subsequent release of that testimony to the public. For one
of the few times in American history, actual grand jury proceedings were
exposed to the general public. Subsequently, the grand jury-an institution
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sheathed in secrecy with roots traceable to twelfth century England'-became
the focal point of the heavily criticized investigation of the President's conduct.
That criticism centered largely on the tactics employed by members of the
Independent Counsel's office in gathering information and calling witnesses
before the grand jury.2 For example, the extensive grand jury examination of
Marcia Lewis, Monica Lewinsky's mother, triggered widespread disapproval
of the Independent Counsel's tactics3 and even prompted legislative proposals
to protect communications between parents and children.4 Yet, the grand jury
investigation led by the Independent Counsel did not violate the constitutional
rights of any witnesses, even ifthe tactics appeared high-handed and the reason
for the inquiry politically motivated.
While the grand jury was the centerpiece of the Independent Counsel's
investigation, the prosecutor's role in leading this body was its true focal point.
The inquiry into the President's conduct demonstrated the primacy of the
prosecutor in guiding the grand jury. This role is crucial because, at the federal
level, the grand jury is frequently the principal means of investigating white
collar crimes arising out of economic activity or personal relationships among
the participants. The federal grand jury's power to investigate crimes is broad
because it is entitled to "every man's evidence."5 The Supreme Court has
described the scope of the grand jury's authority as the power to "investigate
merely on suspicion that the law is being violated, or even just because it wants
assurance that it is not."" It carries out this investigative function through the
authority to issue subpoenas that compel the production of evidence and the
1. The origins of the American grandjury came from the establishment ofthe Assize
of Clarendon by King Henry II in 1166. See SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERICK WILLIAM
MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 151-152 (2d ed. 1968). For a review of the history
of the grand jury, see Mark Kadish, Behind the Locked Doors of an American Grand Jury: Its
History, Its Secrecy, andlts Process, 24 FLA. ST. U.L.REv. 1, 1-22 (1996); Helene E. Schwartz,
Demythologizing the Historic Role of the Grand Jury, 10 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 701,707-10 (1972);
Fred A. Bernstein, Note, Behind the GrayDoor Williams, Secrecy, and the Federal Grand Jury,
69 N.Y.U.L.REv. 563, 574-83 (1994); Susan M. Schiappa, Note, Preserving the Autonomy and
Function of the Grand Jury: United States v. Williams, 43 CATH. U. L. REv. 311,324-28 (1993).
2. See, e.g., Richard Ben-Veniste, Comparisons Can be Odious, Mr. Starr, NAT'L L.J.,
Dec. 21, 1998, at A21 ("(Tlhe aggressive and disproportionate tactics employed by Mr. Starr's
office, often in violation of Department of Justice guidelines and bar association standards of
professional responsibility, have left the public with the justifiable perception that Mr. Starr is
conducting a crusade rather than an investigation .... ).
3. See Myriam Marquez, Editorial, How Would You Feel If Your Daughter Got Stuck
in Starr's Web?, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Feb. 23, 1998, at A10, available in 1998 WL5331740;
Editorial,A Mother Testifies, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Feb. 25, 1998, at A14, available in 1998 WL
8315952; Editorial, Calling Mother to Testify an Invasion of Privacy, PORTLAND OREGONIAN,
Feb. 25, 1998, at El 1, available in 1998 WL 4185429; Editorial, Pushing the Envelope: Starr's
Zeal May Undercut His Public Support, NEWSDAY, Feb. 15, 1998, at B 1, available in 1998 WL
2658701.
4. See S. 1721, 105th Cong. § 1 (1998); H.R. 3577, 105th Cong. (1998).
5. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972).
6. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642-43 (1950).
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testimony of witnesses.!
The grand jury is more than just a vehicle for gathering evidence; it also
has an accusatory function. For federal crimes the Constitution provides that,
"No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury ... ."' These two
functions are, upon reflection, quite different. As an investigative body, the
grand jury may gather evidence simply to assure itself that no crime has taken
place. No real limitations are imposed on its authority to investigate
wrongdoing, except for the privileges an individual witness may assert to resist
responding to questions.9 However, upon completion of an investigation,
whether conducted through the auspices of the grand jury itself or by a police
agency, the grand jury must adopt a neutral stance to determine whether there
is sufficient evidence to indict a person. Thus at the accusatory stage, the
Supreme Court has described the grand jury's role as "protecting citizens
against unfounded criminal prosecutions,"'" and noted that "this body has been
regarded as a primary security to the innocent against hasty, malicious and
oppressive persecution .... ", The grand jury's character shifts from gathering
evidence of criminality to judging the weight of that evidence and determining
whether to initiate a criminal prosecution.
While the grand jury is an independent body, it is misleading to consider
it a self-governing investigatory institution because the prosecutor actually
controls the process of the investigation and the presentation of evidence to the
grand jurors. Technically, the grand jury operates separately from both the
courts and the executive. In fact, however, the prosecutor is closely involved
in and usually controls the grand jury's operation by sending out subpoenas,
reviewing records, deciding which witnesses will testify before the grand
jurors, and ultimately drafting indictments for the grand jury's approval. 2 The
Supreme Court has recognized the prosecutor's leading role in the proceedings,
noting that the prosecutor does not "require leave of court to seek a grand jury
indictment. And in its day-to-day functioning, the grand jury generally operates
7. See United States v. R. Enterprises, 498 U.S. 292,297 (199 1) ("The function of the
grand jury is to inquire into all information that might possibly bear on its investigation until it
has identified an offense or has satisfied itself that none has occurred. As a necessary
consequence of its investigatory function, the grand jury paints with a broad brush."); United
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974) ("The grand jury may compel the production of
evidence or the testimony of witnesses as it considers appropriate%...."). The Supreme Court
has traced the grand jury's authority to compel witnesses to appear back to at least 1612 in
England. See Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 279-80 (1919).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
9. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 688 (stating that the grand jury has a "'right to every
man's evidence,' except for those persons protected by a constitutional, common-law, or
statutory privilege.").
10. Id. at 686-87.
11. Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962).
12. See Ron S. Chun, The Right to Grand Jury Indictment, 26 AM. CRiM. L. REv.
1457, 1474 (1989).
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without the interference of a presiding judge."' 3
Unlilce police investigations, the Fourth Amendment does not constrain the
grand jury's inquiry because its subpoenas are not a "seizure" subject to the
Constitution's reasonableness requirement.14 Moreover, targets of an
investigation have no right to testify before the grand jury or to compel the
prosecutor to present exculpatory evidence. 5 Aside from the privileges any
witness may assert, such as the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination, no explicit constitutional protections are afforded grand jury
targets prior to their indictment. Thus prosecutors are largely free from direct
constitutional limitation on their investigative authority and through the grand
jury can compel witnesses to appear and produce evidence. At the accusatory
stage, the prosecutor drafts the indictment for the grand jury's consideration,
serves as the body's legal adviser regarding the elements of the crime, and
signs the indictment after the grand jurors vote to approve it.'6 In short, the
prosecutor's actions in directing the course of an investigation are largely free
from judicial oversight. With that authority comes the possibility that
prosecutors will abuse the privilege by engaging in misconduct in the course
of a grand jury proceeding.
There has been sustained criticism of the current operation of the grand
jury system. This criticism centers mainly on the prosecutor's control over the
process and the grand jury's concomitant lack ofindependence. 7 For example,
Justice Douglas claimed in a dissenting opinion that it was "common
knowledge that the grand jury, having been conceived as a bulwark between
the citizen and the Government, is now a tool of the Executive." 8 Professor
Peter Arenella similarly assailed "the grand jury's present tendency to rubber-
stamp the prosecutor's decisions," 9 while a senior federal district court judge
asserted that "the grand jury is the total captive of the prosecutor.... "20 The
13. United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36,48 (1992).
14. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 9 (1973).
15. See Williams, 504 U.S. at 53 ("If the grand jury has no obligation to consider all
'substantial exculpatory' evidence, we do not understand how the prosecutor can be said to have
a binding obligation to present it."). Every witness before a grand jury retains the Fifth
Amendmentprivilege against self-incrimination. Additionally, other evidentiary privileges, such
as the attorney-client and spousal privileges, may be invoked by a witness who refuses to
respond to questioning. However, the government is not required to provide Miranda warnings
to a witness regarding the right to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination. See United
States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 582-84 (1976) (Burger, C.J., plurality opinion).
16. FED. R. CRiM. P. 7(c)(1); see United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167,171-72 (5th Cir.
1965) (stating signature of United States Attorney is required for valid indictment).
17. See generally Wayne L. Morse, A Survey of the Grand Jury System, 10 OR. L.
REv. 101, 101 (1931) (noting the criticism that the grand jury was "merely a rubber stamp for
the district attorney").
18. United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 23 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
19. Peter Arenella, Reforming the Federal Grand Jury and the State Preliminary
Hearing to Prevent Conviction Without Adjudication, 78 MICH. L. REv. 463, 474 (1980).
20. William J. Campbell, Eliminate the Grand Jury, 64 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
174,174 (1973).
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perhaps overwrought assessment of some student authors has been to call the
grand jury "a prosecution lapdog"2 and "an ignominious prosecutorial
puppet."' A recent proposal from the defense bar to reform the grand jury
process relies primarily on requiring the prosecutor to present certain evidence,
including the testimony of a target of the investigation, and mandating greater
participation by counsel for witnesses called to testify before the grandjury?3
An oft-cited basis for criticizing prosecutorial misuse of the grand jury is
the frequency with which it approves indictments proposed by the
government-often over ninety-nine percent of the time.' Based on this
statistical premise, commentators infer that the grand jury cannot be acting
independently of the prosecutor; otherwise, it would not indict all of the cases
proposed by the government.25 However, Professor Andrew Leipold has quite
effectively criticized this facile conclusion, arguing that "even brief reflection
shows how unhelpful these figures are. That grand juries nearly always return
true bills may indeed demonstrate that jurors simply approve whatever charges
the government submits, but it could also show that grand juries are a great
21. Judith M. Beall, Note, What Do You Do with a Runaway Grand Jury?: A
Discussion of the Problems and Possibilities Opened Up by the Rocky Flats Grand Jury
Investigation, 71 S. CAL. L. REv. 617, 629 (1998).
22. Bernstein, supra note 1, at 563-64; see also Susan W. Brenner, The Voice of the
Community: A Case for Grand Jury Independence, 3 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 67, 73 (1995)
(discussing "federal grand juries' subservience to prosecutors"); Schiappa, supra note 1, at 349
(opining that "[M]odem exigencies have shifted the balance ofpowerin the grandjury room and
have allowed the prosecutor to assume a position of unprecedented influence.").
23. See Frederick P. Hafetz & John M. Pellettieri, Time to Reform the Grand Jury,
THE CHAMPION, Jan.-Feb. 1999, at 12, 14-15, 63; see also Sam Skolnik, Grand Juries: Power
Shift? Lawmaker's Vow to Give Defendants Clout is Likely to Draw Heat, LEGAL TIMES, Apr.
12, 1999, at 1 (discussing a bill by Representative Delahunt along the same lines and its
opposition by the Justice Department).
24. See Beall, supra note 21, at 631 ("That dependence is proven by the inclination
of federal grand juries to go along with the wishes of the federal prosecutor. In 1984, for
example, federal grand juries returned indictments in 99.6% of all cases presented to them.");
see also Andrew D. Leipold, Why Grand Juries Do Not (and Cannot) Protect the Accused, 80
CORNELL L. REV. 260, 274 (1995) (citing the same statistic). Recent reports suggest that the
current grand jury indictment rate is equally high. See Skolnik, supra note 23, at 16.
25. For example, one author cites the experience of an Assistant United States
Attorney indicting fifteen defendants in only forty-five minutes as an example of the
transformation of the grand jury into the prosecutor's "playtoy." Bernstein, supra note 1, at 573
nn.55-56. However, the prosecutor's alacrity in presenting cases to the grand jury is irrelevant
in determining whether there was any misconduct during the investigation or whether the grand
jury had sufficient evidence to find probable cause ofwrongdoing. The example presented above
involved indictments of drug "mules" whose sole crime, it appears, was possession or
transportation of illegal narcotics. Surely it is not surprising that little evidence beyond an
agent's testimony would be required to find probable cause, especially if all the defendants'
illegal conduct involved the same means of transporting the drugs, or they were all arrested at
the same location, such as an airport or border crossing. Thus, beyond the incident's rhetorical
appeal, the example provides no indications of misuse of the grand jury or misconduct by the
prosecutor.
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success."26 He notes that "there would be cause for concern if grand juries
refused to indict in a high percentage of cases."27
The assumption of the grand jury's critics is that prosecutorial control of
the accusatory process must be harmful to the rights of defendants. However,
these critics fail to marshal without any direct proof that the grand jury would
have acted differently had the prosecutor exercised less control over the
indictment. Certainly, the indictment rate is alluring anecdotal evidence that,
somehow, prosecutors must be abusing the rights of defendants by having the
grand jury indict cases in which the charges should not be filed. The problem
with inferring prosecutorial misconduct from the high indictment rate,
however, is that the data says nothing about whether-or how-prosecutors are
misusing their authority in guiding, even controlling, the grand jury
investigation. The statistics provide no basis to assert that, because grand juries
approve a high number of indictments sought by prosecutors, there must be
significant instances of prosecutorial misconduct in the grand jury's
investigative process. That process is the real point at which prosecutorial
misconduct can affect a potential defendant.
Even if the criticisms of the grand jury's accusatory role were valid, the
alternative would be to allow the prosecutor's office to file charges on its own
authority with no outside involvement in the decision whether to accuse a
person of committing a crime. Because the Supreme Court has not imposed the
grand jury requirement on the states,2" a number of jurisdictions take this
approach. Those states permit prosecutors to accuse people of crimes and leave
the probable cause determination to a preliminary "bindover" hearing before
a magistrate at a later time.29 This approach recognizes that the best means of
controlling prosecutorial misconduct during a grand jury investigation cannot
lie in abrogating or limiting the grand jury's role in deciding whether to
approve an indictment-the harm has already taken place. Thus, the "rubber
stamp" criticism of the grand jury's accusatory function is misguided because
it does not address the stage at which prosecutorial misconduct is most likely
to occur.
Disapproval of the grand jury should be directed instead toward
prosecutorial abuse in the investigatory process, and the focus should be on
evaluating ways to discourage prosecutors from engaging in misconduct. One
26. Leipold, supra note 24, at 275.
27. Id. at 276. One prosecutor has stated: "It would concern me if there were a high
number of no true bills. If anything, I think the statistics show that prosecutors are being prudent
in who they are selecting to go before a grand jury." See Skolnik, supra note 23, at 16 (quoting
James K. Robinson, Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division, United States
Department of Justice).
28. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884).
29. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 14.2(d) (2d
ed. 1992) (noting that two-thirds of the states permit prosecution for serious offenses by
information filed by the prosecutor, and "a preliminary hearing bindover (or defense waiver) is
a prerequisite for prosecution by information.").
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method of policing prosecutorial misconduct during the investigative phase
would be to rely on the courts to monitor grand jury proceedings more closely.
However, the Supreme Court has placed the prosecutor's conduct before the
grand jury almost completely off-limits to any contemporaneous judicial
review. A defendant cannot challenge prosecutorial conduct during a grand
jury investigation by seeking to have an indictment dismissed or evidence
excluded from trial.3" Moreover, the Court has placed indictments beyond the
reach of judicial review3' and stripped the lower courts of any presumed
authority to create and enforce rules ofprosecutorial conduct during grand jury
investigations.32 Indeed, the Court has even removed the threat of monetary
sanctions for violating a defendant's constitutional rights by interposing the
shield of absolute immunity for prosecutorial conduct before the grand jury.33
My thesis is that the Supreme Court has made the grand jury, and the
prosecutors that guide its proceedings, free from judicial oversight in order to
protect the investigative function from outside interference. That function, more
than the accusatory function, defines the importance of the grand jury in the
criminal justice system. As the Court has noted, "The scope of the grand jury's
powers reflects its special role in insuring fair and effective law
enforcement .... The grand jury's investigative power must be broad if its
public responsibility is adequately to be discharged."34 The grand jury serves
a special role in the investigation of crime, especially white collar crimes in
which the authority and presence of a grand jury are the best means of ferreting
out information.35 Because of the grand jury's broad authority to investigate
crime, the Court does not want judges interfering with, and possibly exerting
control over, the investigative process. Absent congressional action to expand
the rights of individuals in a grand jury investigation,36 the Court has refused
30. See infra notes 43-50, 80-95 and accompanying text.
31. See id.
32. See infra notes 106-14 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 199-200 and accompanying text.
34. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343-44 (1974).
35. See Daniel C. Richman, Grand Jury Secrecy: Plugging the Leaks in an Empty
Bucket, 36 AM. CRiM. L. REV. 339,344-45 (1999) ("It is also not surprising that the greatest use
of grand juries as investigative tools is in the white collar area, where potential witnesses
frequently operate within an institutional context that both requires the threat of legal sanction
as a means of obtaining testimony, and takes that threat seriously."). Professor Richman notes
that most federal felony cases, which require a grand jury indictment, involve little or no grand
jury involvement in the investigation, which "will have been conducted by a law enforcement
agency without the assistance of a prosecutor, to whom the case will be presented only when the
agency cannot go further on its own." Id. at 343. White collar, organized crime and major drug
smuggling investigations, on the other hand, often require the use of the grand jury's coercive
authority to proceed. Id. In those types of cases, the grand jury is likely to have a moderating
effect on the prosecutor.
36. See Skolnik, supra note 23, at 1, 16 (reporting on possible legislation that "would
allow witnesses' lawyers into the grandjury room, mandate thatprosecutors turn oversignificant
exculpatory evidence to the grand jury, and prohibit prosecutors from introducing evidence to
a grand jury that would be deemed illegal at a trial.").
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to permit judges to exercise what it has termed a "chancellor's foot veto" that
would allow second-guessing of the methods prosecutors use to gather
evidence and examine witnesses appearing before grand jurors.37 The Court's
approach has been to prohibit defendants from challenging the prosecutor's
conduct of the grand jury investigation because such challenges would provide
a means to delay criminal proceedings by tying up the government's resources
in defending its investigation. The Court relies on the criminal trial to vindicate
a defendant's rights; thus a decision on the core issue of the defendant's guilt
or innocence should be the focus of the criminal process, not the prosecutor's
conduct.
To insulate the grand jury's investigative function from judicial review, the
Court has rejected arguments that would diminish the authority of the grand
jury by imposing limitations akin to those imposed by the Fourth Amendment;
indeed, the Court has explicitly rejected the notion of importing the protections
afforded suspects in police searches and interrogations to grand jury
investigations. 8 Protecting the grand jury by abjuring limitations on its
investigative authority inevitably means protecting the prosecutors that direct
the investigation from judicial review. Given the Court's approach, efforts to
control prosecutorial misconduct during a grand jury investigation must come
outside of the grand jury system itself and the criminal prosecution spawned by
the proceedings in which the misconduct allegedly occurred.
This Article analyzes how the Court has blunted numerous efforts by
defendants to challenge the actions of prosecutors in the grand jury. The
Court's approach to the prosecutor's actions in grand jury investigations has
effectively made that conduct unreviewable by lower courts. In light of that
approach, criticism of the grand jury system based on the prosecutor's
domination of the process overlooks the degree to which the Court has
accepted, and even encouraged, prosecutorial control of grand jury
investigations. Thus, assertions that the grand jury's accusatory role has
devolved into a rubber stamp of the prosecutor are, in a sense, exactly the point.
The Court guards the grand jury's independence from judicial control in order
to protect its prosecutor-dominated investigative function. In the Court's view,
this function is more important than the accusatory function to the effective
operation of the criminal justice system. To that end, the Supreme Court has
rejected efforts that would allow, or worse encourage, courts to adopt rules
impinging on the grand jury's investigative function or the prosecutor's role in
directing the investigation.
Does that mean prosecutorial misconduct during a grand jury investigation
is wholly beyondjudicial review? Justbecauseprosecutorial misconductbefore
the grand jury cannot be challenged in the context of the particular criminal
37. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435 (1973) ("[The entrapment
defense] was not intended to give the federal judiciary a 'chancellor's foot' veto over law
enforcement practices of which it did not approve.").
38. Id. at436.
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prosecution in which it occurred does not mean that alternative avenues are--or
should be-unavailable. However, the authority to monitor prosecutorial
conduct before the grand jury rests with the legislature, not the courts. A recent
congressional enactment, the Hyde Amendment,39 points the way to what this
Author concludes is the proper means of policing prosecutorial misconduct in
the grand jury. This provision, adopted in 1997, permits a defendant exonerated
of federal criminal charges to seek attorney's fees if he can prove the
government's decision to file charges was "vexatious, frivolous or in bad faith
.... ,4o The Hyde Amendment makes prosecutorial misconduct the principal
issue in a claim for attorney's fees, requiring courts to review the government's
conduct as far back as the earliest stages of a case, including the grand jury
investigation. With the power ofjudicial hindsight to assess the propriety of the
government's conduct, the Hyde Amendment gives courts a means to police
prosecutorial misconduct without interfering with the grand jury's investigation
or the conduct of a criminal prosecution.
Part II of the Article reviews the Supreme Court's approach to judicial
control of investigations through the exercise of a court's supervisory power.
The Court was initially receptive to imposing limitations on investigative
tactics through this presumed authority of courts to monitor judicial
proceedings. Once the lower courts began to impose rules on prosecutors
conducting grand jury investigations, however, the Court reacted by severely
curtailing this method of creating rules for how prosecutors could operate
before the grand jury. Part III considers another type of prosecutorial
misconduct before the grand jury called the "perjury trap" and discusses its
origins in two related doctrines: the entrapment defense and the outrageous
government conduct doctrine. This Part argues that the extension of these
doctrines-both of which limit the government's ability to "create" crimes by
implanting a criminal idea in the mind of an "unwary innocent" or otherwise
engage in tactics considered repulsive or unconscionable-are inapplicable to
the conduct of prosecutors in the grand jury examining a perjurious witness.
This Part then considers the Fifth Amendment grand jury right as a possible
means of controlling prosecutorial conduct in the grand jury and concludes that
it cannot provide a way of avoiding the Court's limitations on judicial authority
to review a grand jury's investigation or indictment.
Having shown that virtually all prosecutorial conduct in the grand jury is
off-limits to direct judicial review, Part IV looks at two laws adopted recently
by Congress to address prosecutorial misconduct. The first is the Hyde
Amendment. This Amendment authorizes a vindicated defendant to seek
recovery of attorney's fees ifthe defendant can show the government's position
was "vexatious, frivolous, or in bad faith."4 The second is the McDade Act.
39. Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 617, 111 Stat. 2440, 2519 (1997) (to be codified at 18
U.S.C. 3006A).
40. Id.
41. Id.
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This law makes federal prosecutors subject to the disciplinary rules of the states
in which they undertake any activities in a case.42 In both instances, Congress
adopted the provisions as a means to control prosecutorial misconduct through
separate proceedings distinct from the underlying criminal prosecution. In
conclusion, this Article argues that while these laws may have their defects,
they are nonetheless consistent with the Supreme Court's rejection of defense
challenges during a pending criminal prosecution. Moreover, both laws begin
to provide a means of addressing the problem of prosecutorial misconduct
consistent with the grand jury's broad authority to investigate wrongdoing.
II. THE DEMISE OF JUDICIAL CONTROL OVER INVESTIGATIONS
The Fifth Amendment provides that a defendant charged with a capital "or
otherwise infamous crime" shall be charged in an indictment returned by a
grand jury.43 In Costello v. United States," the Court rejected the argument that
an indictment based solely on hearsay evidence, presumably inadmissible at
trial, violated the defendant's right to a grand jury indictment.45 The Court
stated that "neither the Fifth Amendment nor any other constitutional provision
prescribes the kind of evidence upon which grand juries must act. '46 The Fifth
Amendment right requires that a grand jury actually indict the defendant, but
does not prescribe what types of evidence the grand jury may consider in
determining whether there is probable cause to indict.47 Therefore, "[a]n
indictment returned by a legally constituted and unbiased grand jury... if valid
on its face, is enough to call for trial of the charge on the merits. '48
Costello ruled out any substantive judicial review of the sufficiency of the
evidence considered by the grand jury, effectively requiring a defendant to go
to trial to challenge the government's case. Costello conclusively established
that the grand jury's exercise of its accusatory function was not subject to
42. Pub]. L. No. 105-277, § 801, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998) (to be codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 530B).
43. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury"). The
Supreme Court defines an "infamous crime" as one involving a punishment of hard labor, Ex
parteWilson, 114 U.S. 417,429 (1885), oraterm of imprisonment in a penitentiary, Mackin v.
United States, 117 U.S. 348,352 (1886). The grand jury right is one of two criminal protections
in the Bill of Rights not applicable to the states, the other being the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition on excessive bail. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516,538 (1884) (permitting
substitution of an information for grand jury indictment).
44. 350 U.S. 359 (1956).
45. Id. at361,363.
46. Id. at 362. The defendant objected to the government's reliance on the summary
testimony of three investigative agents who reported the evidence of defendant's tax evasion to
the grand jury given that, at trial, the prosecution had to call 144 witnesses and introduce 368
exhibits to prove its case. Id. at 360.
47. Id. at 362.
48. Id. at 363.
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judicial review except through the continuation of the criminal process in a
trial. While Costello ostensibly protected the accusatory function, the Supreme
Court's rationale shows that its greater concern was to protect the investigatory
function from judicial scrutiny. The Court noted that imposing the requirements
of the evidence rules would introduce unnecessary formality into the process
"in which laymen conduct their inquiries unfettered by technical rules."49 The
Court was not so much concerned about the adequacy of the grand jury's
evidence as it was with a defendant's attempt to interfere with the investigation
by demanding that the trial court review how the prosecutor chose to bring the
evidence before the grand jury.
Costello involved a typical white collar crime, tax evasion, that usually
involves a prosecutor leading a grand jury investigation by subpoenaing
records. The defendant's challenge was not about whether the grand jury had
probable cause-it certainly appears that it did, and the defendant never
contested it-or about the methods used to obtain the documentary evidence.
Rather, the defendant contested how the government presented the fruits of its
investigation to the grand jury. The Court prohibited the defendant from using
a challenge to the validity of the indictment as a means of questioning the
conduct of the investigation because "the resulting delay would be great
indeed. The result of such a rule would be that before trial on the merits a
defendant could always insist on a kind of preliminary trial to determine the
competency and adequacy of the evidence before the grand jury. 50 Costello
limits a court's authority to review the conduct of an investigation under the
guise of a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence considered by the grand
jury.
While Costello foreclosed judicial review of the grand jury's accusatory
function based on the quality of evidence, a question remained: could a
defendant challenge a prosecutor's conduct in the grand jury without
challenging the sufficiency of evidence presented to secure the indictment?
A. Development of the Supervisory Power Doctrine
Aside from those explicit constitutional constraints on the government
enforced by the judiciary, courts have an inherent authority to control their own
proceedings. If that supervisory authority extends to conduct outside of the
courtroom that affects judicial proceedings, then the judiciary can assert a
greater measure of control over the actions of prosecutors and investigators
without having to rely on any express constitutional provision or statute.5
49. Id. at 364.
50. Id. at 363.
51. Professor Bloom has described a court's supervisory power as giving "judges
considerable leeway within the federal court system to rectify procedures or executive actions
that they find inherently wrong even though such procedures and actions may not violate
constitutional or statutory provisions." Robert M. Bloom, Judicial Integrity: A Call for Its Re-
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McNabb v. United States2 ratified this theory. McNabb was the first instance
in which the Supreme Court relied on the doctrine of inherent judicial authority
to supervise the government's conduct by excluding evidence obtained in a
questionable, but not otherwise illegal, fashion.53
The Court reviewed the convictions of three members of the McNabb clan,
each of whom had been convicted of murdering a federal agent. Investigators
extracted confessions from the defendants using "third degree" techniques that
included holding the suspects incommunicado overnight and subjecting them
to repeated questioning.54 The confessions were "the crux of the Government's
case," and the defendants argued that the prolonged questioning constituted a
violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination."5 The
Court did not reach the Fifth Amendment argument, but found that "[j]udicial
supervision of the administration of criminal justice... implies the duty of
establishing and maintaining civilized standards of procedure and evidence."56
Based on this nonconstitutional supervisory authority, the Court held that
evidence obtained by questioning the defendants before they were brought
before a commissioner or judicial officer could not be admitted, even though
"Congress has not explicitly forbidden the use of evidence so procured.""7 The
Court rationalized granting relief beyond that which Congress authorized on
the ground that "safeguards must be provided against the dangers of the
Emergence in the Adjudication of Criminal Cases, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 462, 478
(1993).
52. 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
53. In Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935), the Court ordered a new trial for
a defendant prejudiced by the prosecutor's "undignified and intemperate" statements in closing
argument that were "calculated to mislead the jury." Id. at 85. In addition to its oft-quoted
homily on the duties of a prosecutor, the Berger Court reversed the conviction because the
government's case was not strong and, therefore, the prosecutor's misconduct may have affected
the jury's decision. Id. at 88-89. The Court did not hold explicitly that the trial was unfair or
otherwise conducted improperly, which are the hallmarks of a reversal based on a due process
violation. Indeed, the Court never identified the constitutional or statutory basis for its decision,
but simply declared its authority to correct the harm caused by the prosecutorial misconduct.
Although Berger may be more closely akin to an exercise of the Court's supervisory power to
overturn the conviction, McNabb was the first case to rely specifically on the authority of the
judiciary to oversee the conduct of proceedings in order to establish a rule governing the use of
evidence obtained in a manner that did not violate the defendant's constitutional rights.
54. McNabb, 318 U.S. at 334-35. The federal agent's death occurred during a raid on
an illegal whiskey operation maintained by the McNabbs, "a clan of Tennessee mountaineers
living about twelve miles from Chattanooga in a section known as the McNabb Settlement." Id.
at 333. The defendants were a pair of twin brothers and their cousin, all residents of the
Settlement, and the Court noted their minimal education and that they had rarely left the confines
of the Settlement. Id. at 334.
55. Id. at 338-39.
56. Id. at 340.
57. Id. at 345. Under 18 U.S.C. § 595 (1940), applicable at that time, the U.S.
Marshall had to bring the defendant before the nearest commissioner or judicial officer for a
hearing. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5(a) superseded that provision in 1944. See FED.
R. CRIM. P. 5 advisory committee's note (1944) ("The rule supersedes all statutory provisions
on this point").
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overzealous as well as the despotic. The awful instruments of the criminal law
cannot be entrusted to a single functionary.""s
The Court in McNabb avoided the constitutional issue by relying on its
own inherent judicial authority to advance the purpose expressed by the
congressional enactment. While not invoking its constitutional authority as the
basis for its decision, the Court nevertheless portrayed itself as a last bulwark
against investigatory and prosecutorial excesses. McNabb neither explained the
source of this previously unmentioned authority to exclude evidence based on
an investigator's conduct occurring outside the courtroom nor the standard that
would trigger this inherent judicial duty to establish and maintain "civilized
standards of procedure and evidence."59 The government had not violated any
of the defendants' constitutional rights, at least as the Court had interpreted the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments at that time, and no statutory provision
compelled exclusion of the evidence. McNabb can be read as granting the
federal courts broad authority to review the conduct of and prescribe rules for
prosecutors and investigators appearingbefore them even when those practices
do not traverse any specific right of a defendant.
An important limitation exists on this judicial supervisory power that
distinguishes it from the broader due process protection which the Court later
relied on to assert its authority to superintend outrageous government conduct.
The supervisory power only applies to the federal courts because the Supreme
Court does not exercise direct control over the procedures of state courts. When
a court invokes its supervisory power, it acts only to ensure that the procedures
over which it has direct authority conform to its requirements. On the other
hand, due process applies to any judicial proceeding; thus rules adopted to
apply the constitutional protection cut acrossjurisdictional lines. In thatregard,
supervisory power permits a court to dictate a wide variety of rules, but only
to those courts under its direct control.
The Court's analysis in McNabb was the foundation for the later
development of the exclusionary rule and the broadening of defendants' Fourth
and Fifth Amendment rights.60 Thereafter, controlling the conduct of the police
58. McNabb, 318 U.S. at 343. The defendants in McNabb never argued for reversal
of their convictions on statutory or supervisory power grounds. The Court justified its exercise
of the supervisory authority to adopt an exclusionary rule by noting that its holding furthered the
congressional policy behind a statute requiring federal agents to bring an arrestee before the
court promptly-even though the agents did not violate the provision. Id. at 342-44. The purpose
of that statute, however, was not to ensure expeditious judicial review of an arrest, but to prevent
federal marshals from trying to extract larger fees by transporting prisoners long distances. See
Fred E. Inbau, The Confession Dilemma in the UnitedStates Supreme Court, 43 ILL. L.REV. 442,
455-56 (1948).
59. 318 U.S. at 340.
60. InMapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the Court noted that McNabb adopted an
evidentiary rule for excluding evidence that was similar to the constitutional exclusionary rule
applied by federal courts in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). Mapp, 367 U.S. at
649-50. The Mapp Court extended the exclusionary rule remedy for Fourth Amendment
violations to the states. Id. at 655.
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and other investigatory agencies was a rubric with which the Court became
quite comfortable, as witnessed by the Warren Court era. Indeed, the Court
converted some of its earlier supervisory power rulings, which only governed
federal prosecutions, into substantive constitutional protections applicable in
any criminal proceeding.6' Over time, lower courts began to exercise their
supervisory powerto adoptbroaderrules governingprosecutorial practices, not
just police conduct. To enforce these new rules, judges claimed the authority
to reverse convictions or dismiss indictments as a means of deterring the
perceived misconduct of federal prosecutors, even if those actions did not
violate any express rights of the defendant.
While Supreme Court decisions after McNabb continued to target the
conduct of investigators,62 lower courts also began applying their supervisory
authority to prosecutorial conduct, especially at the grand jury stage of a
proceeding. Exercising supervisory power over conduct before the grand jury
filled a gap in the constitutional protections applicable during an investigation
that allowed courts to adopt what were, in essence, ethical rules to overcome
the constitutional silence.63 For example, in In re Grand Jury Proceedings
(Schofield),6 the Third Circuit held that for any item sought through a grand
jury subpoena, prosecutors must furnish an affidavit explaining the relevance
of the item and that it was not subpoenaed for some purpose other than an
investigation within the grand jury's jurisdiction.65 In UnitedStates v. Jacobs,66
61. See Sara Sun Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases:
Constitutional and Statutory Limits on the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L. REv.
1433, 1451 (1984) (noting that "[a] number of the supervisory power decisions had
constitutional overtones, and several of the decisions anticipated later constitutional rulings.").
62. Two leading Supreme Court cases after McNabb regarding the conduct of
investigators were Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 455 (1957) and Elkins v. United
States, 364 U.S. 206,222-23 (1960). Mallory excluded a confession given when the government
unnecessarily delayed bringing the defendant before a judicial officer, while Elkins overruled
the "silver platter" doctrine by excluding evidence from a federal proceeding that a state official
had illegally seized. See also Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214, 217 (1956) (employing
supervisory power to enjoin a federal agent from testifying in a state criminal trial about
evidence illegally seized from the defendant and suppressed in federal prosecution). The
principal case employing supervisory power to regulate prosecutorial conduct was Jencks v.
United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957). Jencks required that prosecutors produce memoranda of
statements made by witnesses who testified on behalf of the government without first requiring
the defendant to show that the prior statements were inconsistent with the later testimony. ld. at
666, 668-69. Congress modified the rule through a legislative enactment, known as the Jencks
Act, that established the requirements for disclosure of witness statements after the person
testifies. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1994); see also Ellen S. Podgor, Criminal Discovery of Jencks
Witness Statements: Timing Makes a Difference, 15 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 651 (1999) (describing
development of the Jencks Act).
63. See Beale, supra note 61, at 1457 ("The lower federal courts have also employed
their supervisory authority to control the conduct of the prosecutor in order to enforce ethical and
professional standards . . ").
64. 486 F.2d 85 (3d Cir. 1973).
65. Id. at 93.
66. 547 F.2d 772, 773-74 (2d Cir. 1976).
[Vol. 51: 1
1999] PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN GRAND JURY INVESTIGATIONS 15
the Second Circuit dismissed an indictment because the prosecutor failed to
warn the witness of the consequences of testifying falsely, as required by
internal Justice Department guidelines. The court noted that its decision was
"an ad hoc sanction ... to enforce 'consistent performance' one way or
another" with the requirement of fairness. 67 In United States v. Estepa68 the
same court dismissed an indictment under its supervisory power because the
government relied exclusively on hearsay evidence of a government agent in
seeking the indictment. The Second Circuit reached that conclusion despite the
Supreme Court's explicit refusal in Costello to invoke the supervisory power
to limit the prosecutor's use of hearsay before the grand jury.69
As the lower courts began applying their supervisory powers to review the
conduct of prosecutors, the remedy shifted from using McNabb's exclusionary
rule to dismissing indictments or barring retrials because of prosecutorial
misconduct. This development, which caught the Supreme Court's attention
and led to a series of decisions extending the protective approach of Costello,
largely eliminated supervisory power as a means of policing the conduct of
prosecutors in grand jury proceedings.
B. Curtailing Supervisory Power
The lack of explicit constitutional constraints on the federal prosecutor's
conduct during a grand jury investigation made the supervisory power doctrine
the only means available for a court to curb tactics perceived as abuses of the
government's power." The use of a nonconstitutionally based judicial power
to control the acts of prosecutors-granting defendants a remedy that served
more as a deterrent to future misconduct than as a correction of a direct
violation of the defendant's rights-raised a serious separation of powers
67. Id. at 778 (citing United States v. Estepa, 471 F.2d 1132, 1136 (2d Cir. 1972)).
68. 471 F.2d 1132 (2d Cir. 1972). The court stated:
We have previously condemned the casual attitude
withrespectto the presentation of evidenceto agrand
jury manifested by the decision of the Assistant
United States Attorney to rely on testimony of the law
enforcement officer who knew least, rather than
subject the other officers, or himself, to some minor
inconvenience ....
Id. at 1135 (citations omitted).
69. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 364 (1956). The Second Circuit asserted
that "we do not believe Costello v. United States would prevent this exercise of our supervisory
powers should we deem it wise." Estepa, 471 F.2d at 1136 (citation omitted). The wisdom of the
court's analysis is questionable, given that the Supreme Court explicitly rejected that very rule
in Costello.
70. See Hon. John Gleeson, Supervising Criminal Investigations: The Proper Scope
of the Supervisory Power of Federal Judges, 5 J.L. & POL'Y 423, 427 (1997) ("The judicial
temptation to supervise [prosecutors] is powerful. It seems so natural: judges are more
experienced, more dispassionate, better able to weigh the investigators' legitimate interests
against principles of fairness and, presumably, wiser.").
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question regarding the propriety of judicial intervention in the executive's
exercise ofprosecutorial discretion.7' The problem was that as courts imposed
more constraints on federal prosecutors, judges would have to delve into
prosecutorial conduct in directing grand jury investigations. These challenges
frequently arose before trial, giving defendants an opportunity to delay the
proceedings while the court reviewed the government's conduct. The same
problem with delay that troubled the Supreme Court in Costello arose again in
the context of judges exercising their supervisory power to review grand jury
proceedings. Ultimately, the exercise of a greater measure of control over
prosecutors by lower federal courts caused the Supreme Court to circumscribe
their supervisory power.
That process began in United States v. Hasting,2 in which the Court held
that the lower court's reversal of a conviction based on the supervisory power
was improper unless the defendant could show prejudice traceable to the
federal prosecutor's improper conduct." The defendants challenged the
71. See Beale, supra note 61, at 1514-16.
[Tihe federal courts' article III authority to interpret
and apply the Constitution does not authorize the
courts to formulate common law rules to control the
conduct of the executive branch of the federal
government.... [C]ontrary to the suggestion in
several lower court decisions, neither supervisory
power nor federal common law may be used to limit
the constitutionally permissible exercise of
prosecutorial discretion.
Id. at 1514, 1516 (citations omitted).
Professor Beale's influential article argued that the supervisory power offederal courts
was narrow, reaching only "technical details and policies intrinsic to the litigation process, not
the regulation of primary behavior and policies extrinsic to the litigation process." Id. at 1465.
The Supreme Court cited her analysis in justifying its conclusion in United States v. Williams,
504 U.S. 36 (1992), which strictly limited the authority of federal courts to prescribe rules for
prosecutors conducting grand jury investigations. Id. at 50; see infra notes 92-98 and
accompanying text. Two federal district courtjudges also argue thata federal court's supervisory
power does not reach the conduct of prosecutors. Judge Gleeson has stated that
The supervisory power of federal district courts
should be limited to fashioning remedies for
violations of existing federal law and prescribing
rules of procedure for their own, in-house
proceedings. Once the supervisory power exceeds
these boundaries, it intrudes on the functions and
prerogatives of the other branches of government.
Gleeson, supra note 70, at 464; see also Murray M. Schwartz, The Exercise of Supervisory
Power by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, 27 VILL. L. REv. 506,512-13 (1982) (arguing that
the lack of a "persuasive theoretical framework" for exercising supervisory power "raises grave
questions about the legitimacy of any exercise of supervisory power. Without a sound doctrinal
basis, exercise of supervisory power can become little more than a device to enable a court of
appeals to impose its policy judgments upon the district courts.").
72. 461 U.S. 499 (1983).
73. Id. at512.
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prosecutor's closing argument because it indirectly referred to the defendants'
failure to testify. The Eighth Circuit reversed the conviction without
considering whether the error was harmless.74 According to the Court, the
Eighth Circuit improperly focused only "on its concern that the prosecutors
within its jurisdiction were indifferent to the frequent admonitions of the court"
regarding proper closing arguments. 75 The Court noted that a remedy imposed
solely to discipline or "chastise" prosecutors and deter future violations, even
though the actual Fifth Amendment violation was harmless to the defendant,
could not justify the use of the supervisory power.76
Hasting purported to circumscribe the remedy available through the
exercise of a court's supervisory power by requiring a determination of
prejudice to the defendant. The Court's analysis dealt only with a trial
violation, allowing a jury verdict to support a finding that any error was
harmless given the weight of the evidence.77 However, in the investigatory
stage, overcoming the harmless error hurdle would be easy if a court found that
the misconduct had some potential effect on the grand jury's decision to
indict.78 As long as a court could reach this conclusion, Hasting imposed few
limits on a court's supervisory power over the conduct of federal prosecutors
before the grand jury.79
The Court imposed more substantial limits on the supervisory power of the
lower courts in United States v. Mechanik80 and Bank ofNova Scotia v. United
States.8' In Mechanik a majority of the Court held that, after a jury returned a
verdict of guilty, any violation of the defendant's rights by a prosecutor before
the grand jury could not serve as a basis for reversing the conviction." The
Court stated, "Measured by the petit jury's verdict, then, any error in the grand
jury proceeding connected with the charging decision was harmless beyond a
74. Id. at 503-04.
75. Id. at 507.
76. Id. at 506-07 ("[']he interests preserved by the doctrine of harmless error cannot
be so lightly and casually ignored in order to chastise what the court viewed as prosecutorial
overreaching."). The Court further noted that "deterrence is an inappropriate basis for reversal
where, as here, the prosecutor's remark is at most an attenuated violation of Griffin and where
means more narrowly tailored to deter objectionable prosecutorial conduct are available." Id. at
506. See also United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1985) ("Inappropriate prosecutorial
comments, standing alone, would not justify a reviewing court to reverse a criminal conviction
obtained in an otherwise fair proceeding.").
77. Hasting, 461 U.S. at 507.
78. See, e.g., United States v. Hogan, 712 F.2d 757, 762 n.2 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding
that Hasting's prejudice requirement was met because "[i]f not for the clear prejudice resulting
from the AUSA's misconduct, appellants might not have been indicted.") (emphasis added).
79. Hasting, 461 U.S. at 506-07.
80. 475 U.S. 66 (1986).
81. 487 U.S. 250 (1988).
82. Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 70.
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reasonable doubt.,13 Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment, but argued
against the majority's per se approach. According to Justice O'Connor,
rendering any grand jury problem moot once ajury returns a guilty verdict was
too extreme because it would "undermine[] adherence to the very measures that
this Court proposed and Congress implemented to guarantee that the grand jury
is able to perform properly its screening function."' Instead, Justice O'Connor
proposed that a reviewing court determine whether "the violation substantially
influenced the grand jury's decision to indict, or if there is grave doubt as to
whether it had such effect." 5
Bank ofNova Scotia rejected supervisory powers as an independent basis
for dismissing an indictment just to deterprosecutorial misconduct, holding that
"[ilt would be inappropriate to devise a rule permitting federal courts to deal
more sternly with nonconstitutional harmless errors than with constitutional
errors that are likewise harmless. 86 The Court in Bank of Nova Scotia also
adopted Justice O'Connor's test of prejudice in Mechanik to determine the
propriety of an indictment's dismissal before trial because of prosecutorial
misconduct in the grand jury investigation that did not violate the defendant's
constitutional rights. 7 Under that test, a defendant must show that the violation
"substantially influenced the grand jury's decision to indict" in order to secure
a pretrial dismissal for prosecutorial misconduct.88
Did Bank of Nova Scotia alter Mechanik's rule that a petit jury verdict
renders moot any violation of a defendant's rights in the conduct of the grand
jury investigation? The answer must be that it did not, because the procedural
postures of the two cases compel distinct standards of measuring prejudice.
After ajury convicts a defendant, the government has proven that person guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt, unlike a preindictment dismissal in which the only
determination was the grand jury's probable cause assessment in returning the
indictment. If the defendant was found guilty by a jury, then no harm flowed
from the earlier prosecutorial misconduct or violation of the defendant's
constitutional rights, assuming the misconduct or violation did not impact the
trial. If a defendant argues that he would not have been indicted but for the
prosecutorial misconduct in the grand jury, it is difficult to see how that should
affect a valid guilty verdict. In effect, the defendant argues, "I may be guilty of
83. Id. (citations omitted). The violation in Mechanik involved the presence of two
government agents testifying before the grand jury at the same time, which is prohibited by
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(d). Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 67. The Fourth Circuit held that
the violation of a rule so "plain and unequivocal" required automatic reversal of the conviction
regardless of whether the defendant was prejudiced. United States v. Mechanik, 735 F.2d 136,
139-40 (4th Cir. 1984).
84. Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 77 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
85. Id. at 78 (citations omitted).
86. Bank of Nova Scotia, 487 U.S. at 256.
87. Id. at 256 ("We adopt for this purpose, at least where dismissal is sought for
nonconstitutional error, the standard articulated by JUsTuCE O'CoNNOR in her concurring
opinion in United States v. Mechanik.").
88. Id. (quoting United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 78 (1986)).
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the crime, but the prosecutor also violated my rights at an earlier point in time."
Shorn of the supervisory authority to dismiss an indictment or reverse a
conviction only to deter prosecutorial misconduct, a court would be hard
pressed to identify any real prejudice from a violation at the grand jury stage.
Despite its apparent logic, Mechanik created a troublesome perception of
the prosecutor's role in the criminal justice system. Under the Court's per se
approach to post-conviction judicial review of prosecutorial misconduct, the
prosecutor's actions before the grand jury would be practically immune from
any review once a jury returned a guilty verdict. In addition, if the jury finds
the defendant not guilty, further consideration of the prosecutor's conduct is
prohibited. While the possibility of a civil lawsuit exists, such a suit is highly
unlikely to get past a motion to dismiss." Thus, Mechanik appeared to give
prosecutors a free ride in conducting the grand jury investigation of a case. That
result is consistent with Costello, which prohibited judicial inquiry into the
evidentiary basis for an indictment.90 UnderMechanik, neither the propriety of
an investigation nor the prosecutor's conduct in the grand jury can be used to
challenge the indictment, because that would avoid Costello's limitation on the
authority of courts to review the grand jury's exercise of its accusatory
function.
Because the denial of a defense motion to dismiss due to misconduct
before the grand jury cannot be appealed before trial, Mechanik essentially
limited review of prosecutorial misconduct to the trial court.9 Moreover,
Mechanik created an incentive for the trial court to avoid reviewing allegations
of prosecutorial misconduct because once the jury returns its verdict,
misconduct before the grand jury is moot. The standard endorsed in Bank of
Nova Scotia for dismissal before trial was quite high, requiring the defendant
to introduce proof that the misconduct created a "grave doubt" about the
fairness of the grand jury's decision to indict.92 The bar to substantive review
of the grand jury's decision adopted in Costello makes proof of prejudice
extremely difficult because a court cannot review the sufficiency of the
evidence if the indictment is facially valid.
Mechanik and Bank of Nova Scotia largely eliminated supervisory power
89. See infra notes 199-200 and accompanying text(discussing absoluteprosecutorial
immunity for prosecutors engaged in their advocacy function, including appearances before a
grand jury).
90. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 364 (1956).
91. See Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 489 U.S. 794, 800 (1989) (denying
motion to dismiss indictment because a violation of grand jury secrecy rule cannotbe the subject
of an interlocutory appeal). The Court dodged the issue of whether denial of a motion to dismiss
could ever be reviewed after a guilty verdict by blandly asserting that postconviction review
would effectively address whether the grand jury had probable cause to indict in light of any
violations of the defendant's rights. Id. The Court noted that "whatever view one takes of the
scope of Mechanik (an issue we need not resolve here), the present order is not immediately
appealable." Id.
92. Bank of Nova Scotia, 487 U.S. at 256.
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over allegations of misconduct by federal prosecutors before the grand jury 3
Why has the Supreme Court taken such an apparently extreme position
regarding prosecutorial misconduct, especially when it is willing to impose
tougher requirements on the police in the investigatory phase of a case? The
answer lies in reconciling the judiciary's authority under Article III with the
effect of exercising a broad supervisory power over the executive branch.
Judicial inquiry into the government's reasons for acting would force courts to
look at the strength of the government's case and assess its reasons for pursuing
particular tactics. Judicial review inevitably leads to judicial interference, a
point the Court noted in Costello when it stated that grand jury proceedings are
informal and not subject to the rules of evidence.94 Since Costello, the Court
has held that the use of illegally seized evidence does not taint a grand jury's
decision to indict.95 How could the Court permit evidence that admittedly was
the product of a constitutional violation to go before the grand jury while
simultaneously curtailingjudicial authority to review prosecutorial misconduct
in the same forum? The Court's resolution of the issue has been quite
consistent: the need to limit interference with the grand jury's investigation,
and the prosecutor's conduct in leading the proceedings, supersedes the
demand for judicial control exercised through the inherent power of the
judiciary.
C. Ratifying Prosecutorial Control of Grand Jury Investigations
Even though the grand jury has the right to "every man's evidence," 96 the
methods used to obtain evidence for presentation to the grand jury could
provide an avenue for challenging the conduct of the prosecutor. Unlike
conduct in the grand jury room, which requires a defendant to demonstrate
prejudice before relief can be granted,97 the prosecutor's conduct in the
acquisition of evidence under the auspices of the grand jury appears to fall
93. That is not to say that the Supreme Court has forsworn using its supervisory
power completely. In Young v. United States er rel. Vuitton et Fils S. A., 481 U.S. 787 (1987),
decided between Mechanik and Bank ofNova Scotia, the Courtrelied on its supervisory authority
to overturn a criminal contempt conviction. The contempt conviction was based on the violation
of an injunction issued in a civil proceeding that had been prosecuted by counsel for the plaintiff
in the underlying civil action. The Court found that there was a "potential for private interest to
influence the discharge of public duty." Id. at 805. The Court justified its use of the supervisory
power as "especially appropriate in the determination of theprocedures to be employed by courts
to enforce their orders, a subject that directly concerns the functioning of the Judiciary." Id. at
809. Under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a criminal contempt proceeding is initiated
on notice to the party of the "essential facts" supporting the charge, not by a grand jury
indictment. FED. R. CriM. P. 42(b). Young did not affect the Court's restrictive view of the
supervisory power as applied to prosecutorial conduct in grand jury investigations.
94. Costello, 350 U.S. at 364.
95. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 351-52 (1974).
96. Id. at 345.
97. Bank of Nova Scotia, 487 U.S. at 263.
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outside the Court's restrictive approach in Mechanik and Bank ofNova Scotia.
A grand jury subpoena can be issued by the prosecutor without prior
approval by the court, although the grand jury must rely on the court to enforce
the subpoena if the recipient refuses to respond.98 Subpoenas are not subject to
the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement, as the Supreme Court
held in United States v. Dionisio,99 but under Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 17(c) a party may challenge a subpoena if it is "unreasonable or
oppressive."'' 0 Can a defendant challenge the prosecutor's decision to seek the
production of items or a witness's appearance to testify by arguing that the
investigation is unreasonable or the means used to gather information
oppressive, in the sense of being unfair? While Rule 17(c) appears broad, the
Court has made it virtually impossible to use the Rule, in the context of grand
jury subpoenas, to question the prosecutor's conduct of the grand jury
investigation.
For example, in United States v. R. Enterprises'01 the Court held that Rule
17(c)'s reasonableness standard for assessing a grand jury subpoenameant that
"the motion to quash must be denied unless the district court determines that
there is no reasonable possibility that the category of materials the Government
seeks will produce information relevant to the general subject of the grand
jury's investigation."'02 The Court placed the burden of challenging the
reasonableness of the subpoena on the recipient, finding that "a grand jury
subpoena issued through normal channels is presumed to be reasonable. .. . .o3
The R. Enterprises standard for enforcing a subpoena is quite low, given that
a grand jury can investigate conduct to assure itself that there was no legal
violation. The prosecutor's reasons for issuing a subpoena, and a court's unease
over the prosecutor's choice of tactics, are irrelevant to the question of whether
the subject of the subpoena is within the broad purview of the grand jury.
While the Court asserted that "[t]he investigatory powers of the grand jury are
nevertheless not unlimited,"' ' 4 it does not appear possible to challenge a
prosecutor's use of the grand jury to gather evidence on the ground that the
prosecutor improperly sought to compel the production of documents or
appearance of a witness. 5
98. FED. R. CRIM. P. 42.
99. 410 U.S. 1, 9 (1973) ("It is clear that a subpoena to appear before a grand jury is
not a 'seizure' in the Fourth Amendment sense, even though that summons may be inconvenient
or burdensome.").
100. FED. R. CRiM. P. 17(c).
101. 498 U.S. 292 (1991).
102. Id. at301.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 299 (citations omitted).
105. Subpoena recipients are sometimes successful in quashing a grand jury
subpoena, but on narrower grounds such as the assertion of a valid privilege or a claim that the
volume of records sought is too great, so the subpoena needs to be narrowed. Among the most
frequently litigated issues involves the privilege against self-incrimination as a ground to resist
the production of documents. See, e.g., In re Three Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum Dated
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Upon gathering evidence, the next step is for the prosecutor to present the
evidence to the grand jurors and decide whether to request that the grand jury
indict the defendant." 6 As the process moves from gathering evidence to its
presentation, the issue arises as to what evidence a prosecutor should provide
to the grand jury. At one point, a few decisions required the prosecutor to
present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury before seeking an indictment.0 7
However, in United States v. Williams"0 8 the Court demonstrated its aversion
to permitting judicial review of prosecutorial decisionmaking by rejecting a
rule that would require federal prosecutors to present exculpatory evidence to
the grand jury."° In Williams the trial court used its supervisory power to
dismiss an indictment because the prosecutor failed to present "substantial
exculpatory evidence" to the grand jury prior to the indictment."0
The trial court's exercise of supervisory authority appeared quite fair as a
means for maintaining the integrity of the judicial system. If the grand jury
serves as a buffer between the government and the institution of criminal
charges, then requiring the prosecutor to present exculpatory evidence should
not be a controversial proposition, especially when the prosecutor's job is to
ensure "that justice shall be done.' Yet, a majority of the Court reached the
opposite conclusion in Williams, holding that the prosecutor had no duty to
present exculpatory evidence because a federal court cannot (a) compel the
grand jury to consider any type of information in deciding whether probable
cause exists, or (b) inquire into the evidence on which the grand jury based its
finding. "2 In reaching that conclusion, Williams virtually eliminated the
supervisory authority of courts over the conduct of grand jury investigations.
January 29, 1999, 191 F.3d 173, 177 (2d Cir. 1999) (discussing lack ofpersonal privilege when
holding records as a representative of an entity); Peter J. Henning, Finding What Was Lost:
Sorting Out the Custodian 's PrivilegeAgainst Self-Incriminationfrom the Compelled Production
of Records, 77 NEB. L. REv. 34 (1998) (discussing the custodian's role in subpoenaed records).
Those challenges, however, do not call into question the propriety of the prosecutor's conduct,
which falls outside the purview of a court considering a challenge to the grand jury.
106. United States v. Ciambrone, 601 F.2d 616, 622 (2d Cir. 1979).
107. See, e.g., id. at 623 (stating that the prosecutor should tell the grand jury of
"substantial evidence negating guilt."); Johnson v. Superior Court, 539 P.2d 792,794 (Cal. 1975)
("When a [prosecutor] seeking an indictment is aware of evidence reasonably tending to negate
guilt, he is obligated. . . to inform the grand jury of its nature and existence.").
108. 504 U.S. 36 (1992).
109. Id. at 55.
110. Id. at 39 (citing United States v. Page, 808 F.2d 723, 728 (1 0th Cir. 1987)). The
indictment charged the defendant with seven counts of submitting false statements regarding his
assets and income to federally insured financial institutions for the purpose of influencing
decisions on loan applications. Id. at 38. Among the materials the defendant asserted the
government had not furnished to the grand jurors were general ledgers, tax returns, and his
testimony in a bankruptcy court proceeding that, according to the defendant, showed he had not
intended to mislead the banks. Id. at 39.
111. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
112. Williams, 504 U.S. at 53 ("We reject the attempt to convert a nonexistent duty
of the grand jury itself into an obligation of the prosecutor.").
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The Court reasoned that "because the grand jury is an institution separate from
the courts ... as a general matter at least, no such 'supervisory' judicial
authority exists ... ."'n Williams sounded the deathknell for supervisory
judicial review of prosecutorial actions before the grand jury." 4
113. Id. at 47. The Court reiterated the limit on supervisory power over the grandjury,
stating that:
[A]ny power federal courts may have to fashion, on
their own initiative, rules of grand jury procedure is
a very limited one, not remotely comparable to the
power they maintain over their own proceedings. It
certainly would not permit judicial reshaping of the
grand jury institution, substantially altering the
traditional relationships between the prosecutor, the
constituting court, and the grand jury itself.
Id. at 50 (citations omitted).
114. While Williams placed grand jury conduct largely beyond the purview of the
courts, supervisory authority remains available in other contexts to dismiss actions in order to
control or prohibit governmental misconduct, even when it occurred outside the direct purview
of the trial judge. In Wang v. Reno, 81 F.3d 808 (9th Cir. 1996), the Ninth Circuit upheld an
order barring the government from deporting an alien previously paroled into the United States
and used by the government as a prosecution witness. Id. at 821. The court found that the witness
faced an almost certain death sentence based on his testimony in the government's case, and that
"the extraordinary nature of the government's misconduct in securing Wang as a prosecution
witness ... counsel in favor of an exercise of supervisory power." Id. at 820. In United States
v. Ming He, 94 F.3d 782 (2d Cir. 1996), the Second Circuit relied on its supervisory power to
require thatprosecutors permit cooperating witnesses to have counsel present during debriefings
with the government. Id. at 793. The court in Ming He distinguished its use of the supervisory
power from cases such as United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980), which prohibited courts
from using their authority as a supplement to the Fourth Amendment's protections. MingHe, 94
F.3d at 792-93. The Second Circuit stated:
[Our decision] is not an encroachment on the conduct
of executive branch officials, that is, we are not
attempting to govern the conduct of federal agents
whose task is to investigate and prevent criminal
activity. Rather, we are enforcing our general
supervisory authority over members of the bar of this
Court, lawyers who are at the same time United States
attorneys ....
Id. at 792 (citations omitted).
The circuit court was playing a judicial shell game, asserting that it was only
regulating the conduct of lawyers who coincidentally happened to be prosecutors. In fact,
however, the court asserted control over the conduct of another branch of the government under
the guise of its Article III authority to regulate its own proceedings. Judge Gleeson, a district
judge in the Second Circuit, criticized Ming He as a decision that "plainly exceed[ed] the
boundaries of the supervisory power." Gleeson, supra note 70, at 465.
That courts sometimes still exercise their supervisory power can obfuscate the limited
nature of that authority after Williams, especially when the conduct involves a grand jury
investigation. For example, in UnitedStates v. Taylor, 956 F. Supp. 622 (D.S.C. 1997), rev'dsub
nom. United States v. Derrick, 163 F.3d 799 (4th Cir. 1998), a district court dismissed an
indictment because "the court believes it has the discretion under the doctrine of the court's
supervisory power to dismiss should it find the government's actions so outrageous as to offend
the sensibilities of the court." Taylor, 956 F. Supp. at 623. Although the trial court's lengthy
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One could argue in support of the Tenth Circuit's rule that the exculpatory
information requirement would have a prophylactic effect. Rather than risk
dismissal of an indictment, prosecutors would err on the side of disclosure and
present everything arguably relevant to a grand jury. However, that rule might
also burden the grand jury with extraneous information and perhaps subject the
prosecutor to allegations that the defendant's exculpatory evidence had not
been presented properly. Regardless of whether the benefits of such a rule
outweigh its burdens, Williams was not an aberration."' The Court chose apath
consistent with its approach in Mechanik, Bank of Nova Scotia, and Costello
by eliminating the possibility ofjudicial review ofprosecutorial misconduct in
a grand jury investigation."" The thrust of Williams was to insulate the
prosecutor's conduct so that the development of the information on which the
opinion catalogues extensive government misconduct at both the grand jury and trial stages,
including examples of"silence in several instances [that] constitutes subornation ofperjury," id.
at 660, it never discussed prejudice to the defendants, as mandated by Hasting and Bank ofNova
Scotia, as the prerequisite for the exercise of a court's supervisory power to dismiss an
indictment. The Fourth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the indictment, stating that "the record
does not even supportthe districtcourt's individual'findings' ofprosecutorial misconduct, much
less that there has been an established pattern of prosecutorial misconduct in these cases that
would justify the extraordinary sanction of the dismissal of the defendants' indictments."
Derrick, 163 F.3d at 810. As the reinstatement of the indictments in Derrick showed, even a
purportedly egregious finding of misconduct does not negate the need to determine prejudice to
the defendant, especially when the misconduct included actions by the prosecutors before the
grand jury that fall outside the scope of the court's direct authority to control.
115. To demonstrate, assume that Williams had reached the result advocated by
Justice Stevens in his dissent, i.e., that a court could dismiss an indictment under its supervisory
power "if the withheld evidence would plainly preclude a finding of probable cause." 504 U.S.
at 70 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The analysis under such a rule would require deciding two related
questions. First, why did the government withhold the evidence? Second, would the withheld
information have undermined the grand jury's probable cause determination, would it have
produced prejudice? The exercise of supervisory power to demand an explanation for
withholding theinformationcould notbelimited tojustthesecond evidentiary question, because
the Court's decision in Costello prohibited judicial review of the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting a facially valid indictment. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363 (1956).
Unless it was just a subterfuge to engage in a review of the strength of the government's
evidence, the supervisory power analysis must begin by addressing why the government did not
furnish the exculpatory evidence to the grand jury. If the court accepted the government's
justification for withholding the evidence, then an exercise of supervisory power would not be
appropriate because a court cannot dismiss a facially valid indictment under Costello. Id. Only
after finding the government's explanation deficient would a court then be empowered to
conduct a review of the substance of the evidence considered by the grand jury in order to assess
the effect the withheld information would have had on the decision to indict. Assessing
prosecutorial intentions would be the condition for an exercise ofsupervisory powerbecause the
reviewing court would have to determine that the prosecutor acted improperly before deciding
whether the conduct prejudiced the defendant. Thus, the supervisory power analysis requires a
court to scrutinize closely the prosecutor's knowledge and intent as the primary focus of the
determination of whether the government should be sanctioned.
116. See Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 256 (1988); United
States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 78 (1986); Costello, 350 U.S. at 363.
[Vol. 51: 1
1999] PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN GRAND JURY INVESTIGATIONS 25
grand jury acts remains free from any outside intervention.
I. THE "PERJURY TRAP" CHIMERA
The government can pursue a number of avenues when gathering evidence
and preparing to bring formal charges against the defendant. The Fourth
Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, along
with the requirement that the government demonstrate probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant, are the principal limitations at the investigative stage of
a criminal case." 7 Prosecutorial involvement in the preliminary stages of a
criminal investigation is often quite limited in cases involving common street
crimes; rarely is the prosecutor engaged in an actual search or arrest of a
suspect beyond advising officers before the fact regarding the warrant or the
scope of permissible actions. On the other hand, for more complex cases,
especially involving economic crimes, the government attorney frequently
controls the investigation from the earliest stages and, as the case advances,
will determine how to present the evidence to a grand jury."'
The target of an investigation, the person who the prosecutor believes may
have violated the law, can be a tempting source of information in white collar
crime investigations. Prosecutors often seek to compel targets to provide
documents that can be used to demonstrate their knowledge of or involvement
in the transactions at issue. The government may even call a target before the
grand jury to testify without telling that person their status in the
investigation.'"' While the grand jury appearance can give targets an
opportunity to present their side of the story, sometimes prosecutors hope that
witnesses will attempt to explain away their conduct through dissembling
statements-which can be used later at trial to impeach them-or even lie
about their role in the crime. Using the grand jury with the expectation that a
117. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
118. See Peter J. Henning, Testing the Limits ofInvestigating andProsecuting White
Collar Crime: How Far Will the Courts Allow Prosecutors to Go?, 54 U. PiTT. L. REv. 405,409
(1993).
The principal differences between street crime and
white collar investigations are twofold: First, the key
players in the white collar investigation are the
prosecutor and law enforcement agents assigned to
work with the prosecuting body on one side, and
counsel for witnesses and targets on the other side;
second, the timing of the prosecutor's and defense
attorney's involvement is earlier in the investigative
process, well before Miranda and Sixth Amendment
rights are implicated.
119. See United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 189 (1977) ("Because target
witness status neither enlarges nor diminishes the constitutional protection against compelled
self-incrimination, potential-defendant warnings add nothing of value to protection of Fifth
Amendment rights.").
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witness will make false or misleading statements has given rise to something
called the "perjury trap" claim. Defendants charged with perjury occasionally
assert that the prosecutor called the witness before the grand jury expecting that
person to lie, a ruse that manufactures a crime where none existed previously.
The argument is that a prosecutor calling a person to testify with the knowledge
that the witness may lie, creating the basis for a separate criminal prosecution,
is an unacceptable use of the grand jury that violates the witness's due process
right. For example, the Independent Counsel's demand that President Clinton
testify before the grand jury regarding his conduct in the Paula Jones civil
litigation was criticized as an attempt to set a perjury trap. 2 ' Apparently, the
Independent Counsel's trap (if that is what it was) worked rather well because
the impeachment articles centered largely on the President's perjured grand
jury testimony.'
Does setting aperjury trap constitute prosecutorial misconduct by usurping
the proper function of the grand jury in violation of the witness's due process
rights? The few courts that have considered the issue frame the question as
"whether there was a premeditated design on the part of the government to trap
the witness into perjury in such an unfair way that a due process test may
provide a viable defense."'" The focus is on the prosecutor's motive for calling
the witness that lied to the grand jury: Was the government's goal to compel
testimony that would serve as the sole basis for indicting the defendant,
especially when other violations have been lost due to the passage of time, or
did the prosecutor seek truthful testimony?" Under this test, the perjury trap
120. See Robert G. Morvillo, Perjury Traps and Dilemmas, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 6, 1998,
at 3 ("One ofthe oft-repeated descriptions of independent counsel Starr's demand that President
Clinton testify before the grand jury is that it unfairly created a 'perjury trap' for the President.");
Jeffrey Rosen, The Perjury Trap, THE NEW YORKER, Aug. 10, 1998, at 28 ("What Starr really
represents, one might say, is the insidious transformation of the Office of the Independent
Counsel into a Ministry of Truth.").
121. See 144 CONG. REC. H12042 (1998) (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1998) (Articles of
Impeachment of President William Jefferson Clinton).
122. United States v. Simone, 627 F. Supp. 1264, 1269 (D.N.J. 1986); see United
States v. Chen, 933 F.2d 793, 796 (9th Cir. 1991) ("A perjury trap is created when the
government calls a witness before the grand jury for the primary purpose of obtaining testimony
from him in order to prosecute him later for perjury."); Nixon v. United States, 703 F. Supp. 538,
564 (S.D. Miss. 1988) (requiring defendant to show that prosecutor called witness to testify
before grand jury "with the purpose of eliciting perjury.").
123. See Bennett L. Gershman, The "Perjury Trap," 129 U. PA. L. REv. 624, 683
(198 1) ("When the prosecutor structures the grand jury proceedings with the purpose of trapping
a grand jury witness in perjury, he abuses both the perjury sanction and the grand jury.").
Professor Gershman argues that the perjury trap analysis should prohibit a prosecution when it
was the "active design" of the government that the witness lie, but not when the prosecutor
merely expects perjury to take place. Id. at 685. In United States v. Caputo, 633 F. Supp. 1479
(E.D. Pa. 1986), a district court made the same delineation between proper and improper
prosecutorial intent: "The government may call a witness with the expectation that he may
commit perjury, but it may not call the witness for the purpose of securing a perjury indictment."
Id. at 1487 (citations omitted). It is difficult to see how those two intentions can be
distinguished, assuming that there is a difference between them, exceptby asking the prosecutor
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claim has occasionally been raised, but it has never been asserted
successfully.'24
The perjury trap claim is an offshoot of a broader analysis adopted by the
Supreme Court to control the tactics of investigators operating undercover.
There are two aspects of this analysis: the entrapment defense and a due
process claim based on outrageous government conduct. The issue of the
government creating crime, not just prosecuting it, has called for the Court to
balance the need for vigorous law enforcement with the perception of
unfairness when the government takes too great a role in tempting persons to
commit crimes they might not otherwise consider. This broader issue is parallel
to the question of how the judiciary's supervisory power should be used to
control the government's investigation of criminal conduct. The following
section examines the Supreme Court's balancing of these competing concerns
through the entrapment defense and outrageous government conduct claim. The
discussion then focuses on how the prosecutor's conduct in the grandjury, even
if a true perjury trap, is far beyond a court's authority to control through
judicial review.
A. Development of the Entrapment Defense
While most criminal investigations begin after the commission of a crime,
instances exist in which a government agent or informant proposes a course of
illegal conduct in the hope that others will respond favorably, leading to their
arrest before the scheme reaches fruition. The childhood adage that "it takes
for the reason the grandjury summoned the witness to testify. Asking prosecutors tojustify their
decisions in a challenge to the indictment is unlikely to yield any useful information for the court
to evaluate the propriety of the government's conduct. To the contrary, the inquiry is likely to
be harmful to the criminal justice system because prosecutors will have an incentive to frame
their response to protect the indictment. See Peter J. Henning, Prosecutorial Misconduct and
Constitutional Remedies, 77 WASH U. L.Q (forthcoming 1999).
124. See United States v. Regan, 103 F.3d 1072,1079 (2d Cir. 1997) ("[W]e find that
the facts of this case 'render the perjury trap defense inapplicable' and thus do not decide
whether this defense is available in the Second Circuit."); United States v. Chevoor, 526 F.2d
178, 185 (Ist Cir. 1975) ("We cannot say that calling Chevoor in these circumstances even in
the anticipation that he would perjure himself is beyond the pale of permissible prosecutorial
conduct."); United States v. Nickels, 502 F.2d 1173, 1176 (7th Cir. 1974) ("Since the questions
were material to the grand jury's investigation, we doubt that we can inquire into the motivation
for asking them."); United States v. Lazaros, 480 F.2d 174, 177 (6th Cir. 1973) ("Regardless of
the actual beliefs of the United States Attorney, the grand jury was entitled to hear Lazaros's
testimony."); United States v. Phillips, 674 F. Supp. 1144, 1146 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (rejecting a
perjury trap argument on the ground that "[t]he record simply does not establish the type of
outrageous conduct which must be shown before a due process violation will be found."); United
States v. Gonzales, 620 F. Supp. 1143, 1149 (N.D. Ill. 1985) ("[Defendant] cannot be insulated
from a perjury charge solely because he said what the government anticipated he probably would
say."); United States v. Crisconi, 520 F. Supp. 915, 920 (D. Del. 1981) ("[T]hat the Grand Jury
was not used as a 'schill' for securing a perjury indictment against Crisconi is also demonstrated
by the fact that the Grand Jury continued to take testimony relating to the substantive Hobbs Act
violations.., well beyond Crisconi's last appearance before the Grand Jury .... ).
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one to know one" is especially amenable to criminal investigations. Whether
through one of its own agents or with a cooperating witness, the government
sometimes must initiate the illicit plan in order to draw out the criminal
element. 2 For example, sting operations involving purchases of stolen goods
by police officers are routine, and are often supported by photographic
evidence of the criminals selling their wares and tapes of them boasting about
even greater hauls in the future. A more recent development in the area of drug
and money-laundering investigations involves the so-called "reverse" sting, in
which the government supplies the narcotics or tainted funds and then arrests
the purchaser or launderer that attempts to assist the governmental agents.126
Can the government go too far by luring an otherwise innocent citizen into a
criminal scheme and then turn around and charge that person with the crime
that it fostered? The defense of entrapment answers that question in the
affirmative. Chief Justice Warren summarized the scope of the defense in the
simple, if opaque, statement that there must be "a line... between the trap for
the unwary innocent and the trap for the unwary criminal.', 127 The distinction
recognized by the Court cannot be easily discerned, however, because while
the entrapment defense allows the government to draw a criminal into its
scheme, its tactics must not attract an innocent person at the same time.
The Supreme Court first reversed a conviction because the government
impermissibly enticed an innocent person into committing a crime in Sorrells
v. United States.128 A government investigator, posing as a tourist, and three
125. See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435,441 (1932) ("Artifice and stratagem
may be employed to catch those engaged in criminal enterprises.") (citations omitted).
126. See Conrad F. Meis, Note, United States v. Tucker: TheIllegitimateDeath ofthe
Outrageous Governmental Conduct Defense?, 80 IoWA L. REV. 955 n.7 (1995):
[R]everse stings create the opportunity for the
government to create the entire crime, entice an
individual who otherwise never would have broken
the law to participate in the crime, and prosecute the
individual for submitting to the government agent's
persuasion. Unlike regular sting operations in which
the government seeks to convict people who are
already trying to commit a crime by selling
contraband, in reverse stings the government may
create a crime that never would have occurred if not
for the government's conduct.
Id. at 955-56 n.7.
127. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958).
128. 287 U.S. 435 (1932). A series of cases in the late nineteenth century involving
decoy letters designed to entice defendants into sending obscene materials through the mails
rejected the argument that the government's initiation of the criminal activity barred prosecution.
See Grimm v. United States, 156 U.S. 604, 610 (1895) ("The mere facts that the letters were
written under an assumed name, and that he was a government official ... do not of themselves
constitute a defence to the crime actually committed."); Goode v. United States, 159 U.S. 663,
669 (1895) ("[T]he fact that certain prohibited pictures and prints were drawn out of the
defendant, by a decoy letter written by a government detective, was no defence to an indictment
for mailing such prohibited publications."); Rosen v. United States, 161 U.S. 29, 42 (1896)
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friends of the defendant Sorrells, playing on his sympathy for a fellow war
veteran, thrice implored Sorrells to secure some liquor, which was illegal under
the prohibition laws then in effect. The defendant, described by the Court as
"an industrious, law-abiding citizen," succumbed to the government agent's
"gross abuse of authority."129 Having described the defendant in such glowing
terms and castigated an investigator who "deserves the severest
condemnation,"'30 the Court concluded that the government entrapped Sorrells
and reversed the conviction.3 ' While the result was easily reached, the Justices
hotly contested the theoretical foundation for the entrapment defense. The
majority adopted a subjective test, demanding that the government prove that
the defendant was predisposed to commit a crime. 3 ' Justice Roberts proposed
a different theory, based on the character of the government's conduct; under
Robert's theory, the use of improper investigatory tactics to trap an innocent
person should estop the prosecutor from seeking a conviction because of "the
inherent right of the court not to be made the instrument of wrong."'
33
The Court's recognition of the entrapment defense was not based on the
Due Process Clause or any other constitutional protection afforded a defendant.
Instead, the Sorrells majority held that as a matter of statutory interpretation,
every criminal provision adopted by Congress permits a defendant to assert an
entrapment defense.13 To hold otherwise, according to the majority, would be
"contrary to the purpose of the law... [and] inconsistent with its proper
enforcement."'' 3 By interpreting the statute rather than applying a constitutional
analysis, Sorrells applied only to prosecutions brought under federal law.'
36
(quoting Goode for the same proposition); Andrews v. United States, 162 U.S. 420,423 (1896)
(quoting Grimm argument that government officials conduct was not a defense to unlawful acts);
Price v. United States, 165 U.S. 311, 315 (1897) (stating government instigation is not a ground
for reversal when prohibited books are sent through United States mail).
129. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 441.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 452.
132. Id. at 451.
133. Id. at 456 (Roberts, J., concurring).
134. Id. at 450-51.
135. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 446. The majority further noted that it was unable to
conclude that Congress, in enacting the statute, intended that "its processes of detection and
enforcement should be abused by the instigation by government officials of an act on the part
of persons otherwise innocent in order to lure them to its commission and to punish them." Id.
at 448; see also Jason R. Schulze, Note, United States v. Tucker: Can the Sixth Circuit Really
Abolish the Outrageous Government Conduct Defense?, 45 DEPAUL L. REv. 943, 946 (1996)
(noting that "[tlhe majority in Sorrells justified its creation of the entrapment defense by
examining hidden Congressional intent.") (citation omitted).
136. Justice Roberts's separate opinion criticized this approach as a "new method of
rationalizing the defense .... This seems a strained and unwarranted construction of the statute;
and amounts, in fact, to judicial amendment." Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 455-56 (Roberts, J.,
concurring). According to Professors LaFave & Israel,
[The subjective test of entrapment] is adhered to by
the federal courts as well as a majority of the state
courts... [while] [t]he objective approach is favored
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The Court's rationale for permitting defendants to raise an entrapment defense
was that "such an application is so shocking to the sense of justice that it has
been urged that it is the duty of the court to stop the prosecution in the interest
of the Government itself, to protect it from the illegal conduct of its officers and
to preserve the purity of its courts.' 37
A second foray into entrapment came twenty-six years later in Sherman v.
United States. 38 In Sherman the Court discussed the entrapment of a virtuous
recovering narcotics addict who finally capitulated to a government informant's
repeated entreaties for drugs in order to relieve the informant's "presumed
suffering.', 139 The Court reiterated that the subjective test constituted the whole
of the entrapment defense and held that the government informant's conduct
rose to the level of entrapment as a matter of law. 4 The Sherman majority
rejected Justice Frankfurter's call to adopt an objective test that would
incorporate the nature of the government's conduct in determining whether the
government entrapped the defendant. 4'
by a majority of the commentators, and is reflected in
the formulation of the entrapment defense appearing
in the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code.
At least eleven states have adopted it either by statute
or judicial decision. A few other jurisdictions have
adopted a combination of the objective and subjective
tests.
LA_1AvE & ISRAEL, supra note 29 § 5.2(b), at 280; see also Laura Gardner Webster, Building a
Better Mousetrap: Reconstructing Federal Entrapment Theory from Sorrells to Mathews, 32
Amiz. L. REv. 605, 633 (1990) (arguing that entrapment should be based on a rights-based
principle and not viewed as a defense).
137. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 446. Justice Roberts's separate opinion arguing for an
objective test of entrapment used similar language:
[Entrapment] rests . . . on a fundamental rule of
public policy. Theprotection ofits own functions and
the preservation of the purity of its own temple
belongs only to the court. It is the province of the
court and of the court alone to protect itself and the
government from such prostitution of the criminal
law.
Id. at 457 (Roberts, J., concurring).
The tenor of Sorrells was similar to the Court's approach eight years later in McNabb
v. United States, when it exercised the supervisory power to curb another type of investigatory
abuse, the "third degree" form of interrogation. See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 344
(1943).
138. 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
139. Id. at 371.
140. Id. at 373.
141. Id. at 376. The majority focused on the prosecution's failure to prove the
defendant's predisposition to sell drugs, finding that the government's arguments were
"unsupported." Id. at 375. Justice Frankfurter called for adoption of the objective test on the
ground that "courts refuse to convict an entrapped defendant, not because his conduct falls
outside the proscription of the statute, but because, even if his guilt be admitted, the methods
employed on behalf of the Government to bring about conviction cannot be countenanced." Id.
at 380 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice Frankfurter proposed relying on the judiciary's
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The majority opinions in Sorrells and Sherman focused the entrapment
defense on the defendant's predilection to commit a crime, yet both cases
discussed extensively the impropriety of the government's tactics. Sorrells
describedi the investigator's acts as a "gross abuse of authority,"'"a while
Sherman found circumstances in which "stealth and strategy become as
objectionable [as] police methods [such] as the coerced confession and the
unlawful search."' 43 The shameful nature of the government's conduct would
seem to be irrelevant to the question of whether the defendant's subjective
intent was to commit a criminal act even without the government's
inducements. Yet, for the Court not to portray the government's conduct
negatively and the defendant's virtuously is difficult, when the effect of a
successful entrapment defense is an acquittal based in part on a finding that the
government acted improperly.
Ultimately, Sorrells and Sherman sent a mixed message about the
subjectiveness of the entrapment test. Successful assertion of the defense
required objectively characterizing the government's conduct as impermissible
in order to support the subjective conclusion that the defendant was an "unwary
innocent," not an "unwary criminal."'" Regardless of whether the test for
entrapment formally incorporated an evaluation of the government's conduct
as a formal element, investigatory tactics always played a role when a
defendant raised an entrapment defense. 45
Entrapment is a statutory defense because the Court decreed that it is, in
effect, an element of every offense, one facet of the government's proof of the
inherent supervisory power rather than the statutory interpretation theory offered as a
justification for the entrapment defense in Sorrells. See id. at 381. Under either approach, the
Court's entrapment analysis would only apply in federal prosecutions, not state criminal
proceedings.
142. 287 U.S. at441.
143. 356 U.S. at 372.
144. Id.
145. The Court's most recent entrapment case, Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S.
540 (1992), highlights the continuing tension between the subjective test, which it professed to
follow, and the importance of the government's investigatory tactics in assessing an entrapment
claim. In Jacobson the Court reversed a conviction for receiving child pornography because the
government had failed as a matter of law to prove that the defendant was predisposed to commit
the crime before being approached by agents trying to sell to him the illicit material. The Court
highlighted the government's repeated attempts to persuade the defendant to purchase the
material over twenty-six months "through five fictitious organizations and a bogus pen pal"
before he finally succumbed. Id. at 543. Moreover, the Court depicted the defendant
sympathetically, noting for no apparent reason that he was "a 56-year-old veteran-turned-farmer
who supported his elderly father in Nebraska .... Id. at 542. The government's conduct was
never far from the surface in Jacobson, despite the Court's purported adherence to the subjective
test, because of the need to cast the defendant, who admitted committing the crime, in a
sympathetic light and the investigators as overbearing the will of this unwary innocent. See Paul
Marcus, Presenting, Back From the [Almost] Dead, The Entrapment Defense, 47 FLA. L. REv.
205, 219 (1995) ("The language of the Supreme Court in Sherman and Jacobson signals genuine
movement from an exclusive focus on the defendant's state of mind to a much more searching
view of the government's behavior.").
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applicable mens rea. In turn, the government's conduct in enticing the
defendant appears to be one aspect of assessing the defendant's innocent state
ofmind. Because the Court's analysis of governmental misconduct arose only
in connection with the statutory entrapment defense, such misconduct would
not seem to create a separate constitutional claim."4 Unfortunately, the
entrapment cases were not models of clarity, to say the least, as reflected by the
Court's struggle to explain clearly how the nature of the government's conduct
related to the defendant's predisposition to commit the crime.
B. Recognizing an Outrageous Government Conduct Claim
One attempt by Justice Rehnquist to articulate how the nature of the
government's conduct related to the viability of an entrapment defense came
in United States v. Russell.'47 This attempt resulted in a slip of the judicial
tongue that inadvertently recognized a second means to challenge misconduct
in an investigation. In Russell an undercover narcotics agent provided the
defendants with a key chemical for their production of an illegal drug. The
lower court reversed the conviction on the ground that the government
entrapped the defendants based on "an intolerable degree of governmental
participation in the criminal enterprise," without referring to their
predisposition to commit the crime.' 48 In the course ofreaffirming the primacy
of the subjective test of entrapment adopted in Sorrells and Sherman, Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the majority, paused to interject the following
observation: "While we may some day be presented with a situation in which
the conduct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process
principles would absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial
processes to obtain a conviction.., the instant case is distinctly not of that
breed." 49 This single off-handed reference explicitly articulated a due process
constraint on the government's investigation of criminal activity.
146. But see Paul Marcus, The Due Process Defense in Entrapment Cases: The
Journey Back, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 457 (1990):
We should not permit the government to prosecute
individuals where the government conduct itself was
outrageous or egregious. We should not permit such
prosecutions, not because a particular person's rights
were violated, but rather because such government
activity, in Justice Frankfurter's words, does "more
than offend some fastidious squeamishness or private
sentimentalism about combatting crime too
energetically. This is conduct that shocks the
conscience."
Id. at 462 (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952)).
147. 411.U.S. 423 (1973).
148. United States v. Russell, 459 F.2d 671,673 (9th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 411 U.S. 423
(1973).
149. 411 U.S. at 431-32 (emphasis added).
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To support his assertion, Justice Rehnquist cited to the seminal decision of
Rochin v. California,'5" which held that governmental actions in gathering
evidence that "shock the conscience" violate due process.' Justice
Frankfurter's opinion inRochin recognized the problemwith using due process
as a means to protect against government overreaching in criminal
investigations, asserting that "[w]e are not unmindful that hypothetical
situations can be conjured up, shading imperceptibly from the circumstances
of this case andby gradations producingpractical differences despite seemingly
logical extensions." ' InRochin amajority of the Court encountered such a due
process violation when the government forcibly extracted evidence from the
defendant's stomach by forcing a tube down his throat after he had swallowed
two capsules that contained illegal drugs. The Rochin Court found that,
although "[t]he faculties of the Due Process Clause may be indefinite and
vague... we are compelled to conclude that the proceedings by which this
conviction was obtained do more than offend some fastidious squeamishness
or private sentimentalism about combatting crime too energetically. This is
conduct that shocks the conscience."1 3 For all its imprecision, Rochin and
Russell's acknowledgment of a due process protection putting some outer limit
on the government's investigatory power reflected a realistic understanding of
the practical role of the judiciary-that one day there may come a case so
offensive that no fair-minded judge could abide the government's acts.15
150. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
151. Id. at 172.
152. Id. at 174.
153. Id. at 172 (emphasis added). Justice Black noted that due process only provided
a "nebulous standard," id. at 175 (Black, J., concurring), while Justice Douglas stated that
application of the majority's approach would "turn not on the Constitution but on the
idiosyncrasies of the judges who sit here." Id. at 179 (Douglas, J., concurring). Professor Crump
aptly described the problem with Rochin's "shock the conscience" test for deciding cases:
The approach of asking whether the government's
conduct is sufficiently "shocking" before condemning
it gives a comfortable sense that this test will
recognize only compelling cases, leaving a general
presumption of deference to the legislature. Thus the
Rochin test, by focusing upon the government's
conduct, seems far removed from the subjectivity of,
for example, the importance-to-the-individual
approach. But perhaps that is so only because it
papers over subjective evaluations of the underlying
factors with vague terms such as "conscience,"
"decency," and one's "sense ofjustice"--all ofwhich
might give free reign to the judge's idiosyncratic
prejudices.
David Crump, How Do the Courts Really Discover Unenumerated Fundamental Rights?
Cataloguing the Methods of JudicialAlchemy, 19 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 795, 880 (1996).
154. See John David Buretta, Note, Reconfiguring the Entrapment and Outrageous
Government Conduct Doctrines, 84 GEO. L.J. 1945, 1977 (1996) ("It is for such extreme
situations-when government employs law enforcementpower arbitrarily or oppressively-that
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However, unlike the application of Rochin's "shock the conscience" test
to the forced extraction of evidence, Russell's assertion regarding a conceivable
state of affairs was wholly unnecessary to the resolution of the case. Moreover,
Russell's acknowledgment ofjudicial authority, while understandable, proved
to be a gremlin in the criminal justice system. Three years later, in Hampton v.
United States,' Justice Rehnquist tried to retract his earlier assertion of
judicial authority by contending that Russell "ruled out the possibility that the
defense of entrapment could ever be based upon governmental misconduct in
a case... ."'56 Once spoken, however, the apparent recognition of a separate
due process right to be free from governmental misconduct in investigating a
crime could not be recanted so easily. Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion in
Hampton attracted only two other votes; Justices Powell and Blackmun
concurred in the judgment, but asserted their unwillingness "to conclude that
an analysis other than one limited to predisposition would never be appropriate
under due process principles."' 7 The three dissenting justices stated similarly
that "Russell does not foreclose imposition of a bar to conviction-based upon
our supervisory power or due process principles-where the conduct of law
enforcement authorities is sufficiently offensive .... .""' Although the
outrageous government conduct claim was irrelevant to the judgment in
Hampton, simple addition showed that two concurring plus three dissenting
Justices giving generalized support to the Russell dictum meant that a majority
recognized that the due process analysis-it hardly qualified as a
defense-retained some viability. This constitutional protection was distinct
from entrapment, yet reflected the view of the dissenting Justices in Sorrells
and Sherman that the government's misconduct should be the focus. Moreover,
the entrapment and outrageous government conduct doctrines are the judiciary's shield of
potential recourse to prevent law enforcers from using their power as a tool of unreasonable,
unnecessary oppression."). For example, if a terrorist planted a device that would kill millions,
and the government tortured the person to learn its location, would a court permit a prosecution
in which the government derived the principle evidence of the crime from the defendant's
coerced admission? A court cannot simply abdicate all authority to review the conduct of the
government if it may have to countenance a prosecution that is based on evidence obtained
through torture. See GUIDO CALABREsi, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 173-74
(1982). Judge Calabresi describes the use of "subterfuge" to permit the clash of two absolutes
in the law when a clear rule that does not permit torture meets the need to save millions of lives,
and "that, like the judge in the torture example, we decide better, in practice, by denying that
[subterfuge] ever takes place at all."Id at 175. See also JOSEPHD. GRANO, CONFESSIONS, TRUTH,
ANDTHELAW 100 (1993) ("[I]nterrogation tactics at some undefined point may involve such an
assault on the defendant's autonomy and dignity that constitutional intervention, through the
vehicle of the due process voluntariness requirement, becomes appropriate.").
155. 425 U.S. 484 (1976).
156. Id. at 488-89. Justice Rehnquist's opinion went on to assert: "If the police
engage in illegal activity in concert with a defendant beyond the scope of their duties the remedy
lies, not in freeing the equally culpable defendant, but in prosecuting the police under applicable
provisions of state or federal law." Id. at 490 (citations omitted).
157. Id. at 493 (Powell, J., with Blackmun, J., joining, concurring).
158. Id. at 497 (Brennan, J., with Stewart, J. and Marshall, J., joining, dissenting).
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unlike the subjective test of entrapment, which is limited to federal
prosecutions, the Due Process Clause applies in every criminal proceeding,
state or federal. Was Russell's slip of the tongue, at least from Justice
Rehnquist's perspective, the ultimate victory for the objective view of
entrapment? No one knows for sure.
Adding to the confusion surrounding the propriety of this due process
protection was United States v. Payner,'9 in which a majority of the Court
appeared to take back what it apparently provided in Russell and refused to
rescind in Hampton. InPayner the defendant objected to a clearly illegal search
of a banker's briefcase that revealed the defendant's interest in an offshore
bank account. After holding that the defendant did not have standing to raise
a third-party's Fourth Amendment claim,'60 the Court rejected the argument
that the outrageousness of the government's conduct constituted a due process
violation requiring suppression of the evidence in the absence of a violation of
an enumerated right of the defendant.'61 Justice Powell, whose concurrence in
Hampton supported the outrageous government conduct theory, wrote the
majority opinion in Payner; ironically, Powell's opinion cited the very
language from Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion in Hampton that sought to
negate the suggestion that due process provided an independent basis for
rejecting a conviction because of government misconduct.'6 Did Justice
Powell's apparent about-face subtract one of the votes from Hampton? Like
Russell and Hampton, Payner was not a model of clear judicial analysis: the
Court buried its apparent rejection of the outrageous government conduct claim
in a footnote at the end of the opinion, and its statement was only dictum
because resolution of the issue was unnecessary for the Court's standing
analysis.'63
If outrageous governmental conduct remains the due process standard, then
conduct that implicates the supervisory power could arguably be characterized
as a violation of the Due Process Clause because anything that undermines the
159. 447 U.S. 727 (1980).
160. Id. at 735.
161. Id. at 737 n.9.
162. Id. ("But even ifwe assume that the unlawful briefcase search was so outrageous
as to offend fundamental 'canons of decency and fairness,' ... the fact remains that '[t]he
limitations of the Due Process Clause... come into play only when the Government activity in
question violates some protected right of the defendant."' (brackets in original) (quoting Rochin
v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952); Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 490 (1975))
(citation omitted).
163. See Schulze, supra note 135, at 956 ("As a result of the varying approaches
taken by the Supreme Court Justices in Sorrells, Sherman, Russell, Hampton, and now Payner,
the federal courts have been without any settled rules on which to resolve the due process issue.
The variety in these courts' interpretations of the state of the defense demonstrate this
confusion."); Buretta, supra note 154, at 1967 ("The total lack of consistency in the circuits is
unsurprising; the Supreme Court has given woefully inadequate definition to the doctrine and
the due process principles underlying it.").
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integrity of the judicial system might be labeled outrageous.'1 In Hampton
Justice Brennan's dissent noted that the government's investigatory actions
would bar a conviction "based upon our supervisory power or due process
principles-where the conduct of law enforcement authorities is sufficiently
offensive.... .16 The close connection between due process and supervisory
power is further highlighted by the fact that the remedy afforded for
prosecutorial misconduct under either analysis is usually the same, dismissal
of the indictment. Some lower court decisions, especially in the Ninth Circuit,
expressly relied on both due process and supervisory power as alternative
rationales for dismissing an indictment. 166 Even courts relying only on their
supervisory power to police prosecutorial misconduct use the language of
164. See Schwartz, supra note 71, at 508-09 ("The lack of clear perimeters often
makes it difficult to determine whether [the court] has actually exercised its supervisory power,
or instead has based its decision on an alternative ground.").
165. 425 U.S. at 497 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
166. See Wang v. Reno, 81 F.3d 808, 819-20 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that
government conduct in attempting to deport a witness back to China to face an almost certain
death sentence for giving testimony in the United States for the prosecution was both "a violation
of his liberty interest in personal security and thus of his due process rights secured by the Fifth
Amendment," and that the "extraordinary nature of the government's misconduct in securing
Wang as a prosecution witness ... counsel in favor of an exercise of supervisory power.");
United States v. Marshank, 777 F. Supp 1507, 1524-1524, 1528, 1530 (N.D. Cal. 1991)
(dismissing indictmentbased on government's use ofdefendant's attorney as an informant about
the defendant on, inter alia, outrageous government conduct and supervisory power grounds);
United States v. Caputo, 633 F. Supp. 1479, 1491 (E.D. Pa. 1986) rev'd, 825 F.2d 754 (3d Cir.
1987) (dismissing two counts of a sixteen-count indictment under supervisory power grounds
because "the government's conduct in issuing the sham subpoena was improper and amounts to
prosecutorial misconduct"); United States v. DeMarco, 401 F. Supp. 505,514 (C.D. Cal. 1975)
(holding that the government must disclose exculpatory evidence to the grand jury, and
"[w]hether this duty be based upon the grand jury provisions of the fifth amendment or the due
process clause of the fifth amendment, or in the exercise of this court's supervisoryjurisdiction,
it must be imposed.") (citation omitted).
The tortured history of United States v. Simpson, 813 F.2d 1462 (9th Cir. 1987), rev'd
after remand, 927 F.2d 1088 (9th Cir. 1991), illustrates quite aptly the apparent
interchangeability of the due process and supervisory power analysis. The district court in
Simpson first dismissed the indictment because of outrageous government conduct related to the
government's use of an informant, a prostitute, who engaged in sexual relations with the
defendant while furnishing information to the government. The Ninth Circuit reversed the lower
court, holding that the government's conduct was not outrageous because "our Constitution
leaves it of the political branches of government to decide whether to regulate law enforcement
conduct which may 'offend some fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism about
combatting crime too energetically,' but which is not antithetical to fundamental notions of due
process." 813 F.2d at 1468 (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165,172 (1952)). On remand,
the district court again dismissed on the basis of its supervisory power, relying on the same
conduct that did not rise to the level of a due process violation. Once again, the Ninth Circuit
reversed, this time holding that the "supervisory power simply does not give the courts the
authority to make up the rules as they go, imposing limits on the executive according to whim
or will." United States v. Simpson, 927 F.2d 1088, 1090 (9th Cir. 1991).
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outrageous government conduct to support the exercise ofjudicial authority.'67
For example, in United States v. Banks,' 5 a federal district court dismissed an
indictment with prejudice under its supervisory power because prosecutorial
"misconduct formed a pattern throughout the course of the trial [that] leads [the
judge] to the belief that this case was not prosecuted in good faith or in the
spirit ofjustice."'' 9
That some courts have treated due process and supervisory power as
alternative means to reach the same result reflected the Supreme Court's
decidedly casual approach in formulating the doctrines. The assertion of the
judiciary's supervisory authority sprang forth unexpectedly in McNabb, with
the Court raising the issue sua sponte after rejecting the defendant's Fifth
Amendment claim,' 0 but not discussing how that authority should be applied
in future cases. Similarly, Russell's apparent creation of an outrageous
government conduct standard for reviewing indictments was little more than
a rhetorical aside and not the product of a principled review of the Due Process
Clause.'7 ' It is not surprising that the unifying theme of both doctrines is
preservation of some judicial role in overseeing the government's conduct in
the investigatory phase of a case beyond enforcing just the explicit protections
of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Due process and supervisory power are
two sides of the same prosecutorial misconduct coin.
167. See United States v. Taylor, 956 F. Supp. 622,623 (D.S.C. 1997) ("[T]he totality
of the government's actions in these matters rises to the level of egregious prosecutorial
misconduct, and... this is a sufficient finding on which the court can exercise its supervisory
power.") (emphasis added), rev'd sub nom. United States v. Derrick, 163 F.3d 799 (4th Cir.
1998), cert. denied, __ U.S. _, 119 S. Ct. 1808 (1999). The opposite is also true, as some
courts and commentators have used the language of supervisory power to support a "due
process" basis for the outrageous government conduct doctrine. See Stephen A. Miller,
Comment, The Case for Preserving the Outrageous Government Conduct Defense, 91 Nw. U.
L. RE v. 305, 345 (1996) (citing McNabb for the proposition that the outrageous government
conduct doctrine is necessary "to remedy violations of fundamental fairness by law enforcement
officials").
168. 383 F. Supp. 389 (D.S.D. 1974).
169. Id. at 397. One act that led to the dismissal was the prosecutor's refusal to go
forward when the jury fell below twelve members, which was certainly within the government's
rights despite the judge's assertion that the prosecutor's reasons for this decision, as expressed
to the media, reflected "a violation of the duty of the prosecutor and warrants exercise of this
court's supervisory powers." Id. In making this determination, the district judge noted the
prosecutor's public statement that "he felt that the chances of obtaining a conviction from the
remaining jurors were 'slim."' Id. This act was only the final one of many incidences of
misconduct cited by the court. Yet, it is unclear why a prosecutor's decision to refuse to proceed
with a case and demand a mistrial, which was clearly within the government's rights as a party
and is an acceptable strategic decision by an advocate on behalf of the client, should be cited to
support the need to invoke a judicial power designed to ensure a civilized proceeding and to
protect the integrity of the court. Exercising a right to demand a mistrial that is available to both
sides hardly befits partial justification for a remedy dismissing a case and barring any additional
proceedings against the defendant.
170. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340-41 (1943).
171. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423,431-32 (1973).
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These are the odd origins and development of a constitutional protection
that has not been discussed by the Supreme Court since Payner." Unlike
entrapment, which is a jury question, outrageous government conduct is a
question of law, and finding such a due process violation should bar the
government from even pursuing a criminal prosecution. Justice Rehnquist's
opinion in Russell warned that "the defense of entrapment... was not intended
to give the federal judiciary a 'chancellor's foot' veto over law enforcement
practices of which it did not approve."'' Russell's off-handed recognition of
the outrageous government conduct claim, and its nature as an undefined
standard that courts can use to curb questionable investigatory tactics that do
not violate explicit constitutional protections, may explain the confusion
surrounding its existence and scope. Simply put, divining a standard for
deciding what constitutes outrageous government conduct is an exercise in
172. The Third Circuit's decision in United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050 (3d Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1047 (1996), dismissed as dictum Payner's apparent rejection of
Russell, asserting that there was "no reason to doubt that the [Supreme] Court continues to
recognize a due process claim premised upon outrageous law enforcement investigative
techniques." 89 F.3d at 1064. See also Meis, supra note 126, at 965 n.86 ("But one hardly can
treat [Payner's] aside, tucked away in a footnote, as anything more than dicta [sic]."). It is not
clear why "no reason to doubt" exists when the Supreme Court's first word on the subject in
Russell was dictum, and its last word, while still dictum, plainly rejected reliance on the
government's conduct as a separate due process claim. 411 U.S. at431-32,435. Although many
courts readily accept an "outrageous government conduct" defense as a fully developed
constitutional protection, some almost celebrate the fact that it has been used so rarely as to be
virtually impossible to prove. For example, in UnitedStates v. Santana, 6 F.3d 1 (1 st Cir. 1993),
the First Circuit stated: "The banner of outrageous misconduct is often raised but seldom
saluted .... [Tihe doctrine is moribund; in practice, courts have rejected its application with
almost monotonous regularity." Id. at 4. Circuit Judge Selya's opinion then spent the next four
pages analyzing whether the government's conduct was sufficiently outrageous to require
dismissal of the indictment under dueprocess. Finding that it was not, the First Circuit reinstated
the prosecution. For something so infrequently applied, it took considerable judicial effort to
reject the defendant's claim.
173. 411 U.S. at 435. Entrapment has not become the "chancellor's foot veto"
because the outrageous government conduct claim has been a worthy substitute that permits
courts to review the government's conduct of an investigation to decide whether it went too far
without enunciating standards or even considering the defendant's predisposition. Judge
Easterbrook noted that the "[i]nability to describe in general terms just what makes tactics too
outrageous to tolerate suggests that there is no definition-and 'I know it when I see it' is not
a rule of any kind, let alone a command of the Due Process Clause." United States v. Miller, 891
F.2d 1265, 1273 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J., concurring). But see Marcus, supra note 145,
at 465:
Judge Easterbrook misses the mark on why the
presence of the defense is important. Its significance
lies not in the fact that it will often be successful; it
will not. Ratheritis important because itcreates outer
limits on appropriate law enforcement techniques
and... [demonstrates] that courts are indeed willing
to draw some lines that cannot be crossed even in
pursuit of criminals.
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futility.1
74
174. See Buretta, supra note 154, at 1966-67 ("Russell and Hampton have provided
only the most general outline of what the outrageous government conduct doctrine means.
Whereas the entrapment doctrine is wooden and narrow, the outrageous government conduct
doctrine is teflon and ambiguous. Understandably, the circuit courts have had a terrible time
applying the doctrine."). In United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978), reputed to be
the only successful outrageous government conduct case, the Third Circuit overturned
convictions after the government enticed the defendants to operate a narcotics laboratory for
which undercover agents supplied the necessary materials. Compare id. at 381 ("[T]he DEA
agents deceptively implanted the criminal design inNeville's mind. They sethim up, encouraged
him, provided the essential supplies and teclmical expertise, and when he and Kubica
encountered difficulties in consummating the crime, they assisted in finding solutions."), with
id. at 386 (Adams, J., dissenting) (noting that the similarities between Twigg and Russell suggest
that "government involvement in a similar perhaps even more questionable situation, is not
'outrageous' enough to justify reversal."). In United States v. Beverly, 723 F.2d 11 (3d Cir.
1983), however, a different Third Circuit panel found no outrageous government conduct when
an undercover agent, aware of the defendants' financial difficulties, proposed an arson scheme
in which the agent took the defendants to a service station where the agent bought the gasoline
and then drove the defendants to the site. The court was "troubled" by the agents' tactics, id. at
11-12, but did not disturb the convictions. In neither Twigg nor Beverly could the defendants
establish an entrapment defense; however, in Twigg the defendants were set free, while in
Beverly the Third Circuit upheld the convictions despite the apparently more egregious actions
of the agent who encouraged the defendants to commit the very crime suggested by the
government. The standard for outrageous government conduct is not elusive; it is nonexistent.
Aside from Twigg, two other circuit court cases decided after Russell rely in part on
a finding of outrageous government conduct. United States v. Bogart, 783 F.2d 1428,1436, 1438
(9th Cir. 1986), vacated in part sub nom. on other grounds, United States v. Wingender, 790
F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Lard, 734 F.2d 1290,1296-97 (8th Cir. 1984). Another
case, United States v. Basurto, 497 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1974), found a due process violation when
the prosecutor proceeded to trial knowing that the government's key witness had perjured
himself in material matters at the grand jury and subsequently minimized the perjury in
representations to the court. Id. at 784-85. The court cited neither Russell nor Rochin in support
of its decision.
The haphazard nature of the outrageous government conduct cases is not limited to
courts that accept the doctrine. The Sixth Circuit rejected the due process claim in United States
v. Tucker, 28 F.3d 1420 (6th Cir. 1994), holding that Payner's "clear statement rejecting any
'objective' assessment of the government's conduct, we believe, lays to rest whatever modicum
of Russell's dicta may have survived Hampton." Id. at 1428. Two years after Tucker, however,
a different panel of the Sixth Circuit held in United States v. Pipes, 87 F.3d 840 (6th Cir. 1996),
that the investigators' conduct "implicates no due process interests of the defendant, and does
not shock the conscience, [so] it cannot bar his conviction." Id. at 844. Even though Pipes cites
Tucker with regard to the entrapment defense, the panel failed to notice that Tucker clearly
rejected the outrageous government conduct claim. Instead, Pipes reached the merits of the due
process issue and found that the conduct did not cross the line into outrageousness.
The due process analysis has even found its way into sentencing in federal courts.
Some circuit courts of appeal have permitted defendants to assert a due process outrageous
government conduct claim to show that government agents manipulated the defendant into
committing a more serious crime than he intended. A reduced sentence can result. See United
States v. Naranjo, 52 F.3d 245, 249-51 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Barth, 990 F.2d 422, 425
(8th Cir. 1993). The due process claim, at least with regard to sentencing, has been rejected by
other courts. See United States v. Walls, 70 F.3d 1323, 1329-30 (D.C. Cir. 1995); United States
v. Williams, 954 F.2d 668, 673 (11 th Cir. 1992). It has also been criticized as an effort to rewrite
the federal sentencing guidelines. See Jeff LaBine, Note, Sentencing Entrapment Under the
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C. Whither the Perjury Trap?
The outrageous government conduct claim is of dubious origin and appears
to exist as a type of judicial placebo, cited as a means of demonstrating the
authority of a court to rein in the prosecutor if necessary, but nonetheless more
illusory than real. In contrast, entrapment is recognized by al jurisdictions, but
its utility may be limited because, at least in federal courts, the defendant's
subjective intent is the criterion for a successful assertion of the defense. A
defendant who acts voluntarily in choosing to follow a course of conduct that
involves a criminal violation, absent repeated or overbearing government
entreaties, will be unlikely to succeed on either an entrapment or an outrageous
government conduct claim-which brings us back to the perjury trap: Is it a
type of entrapment, a form of the outrageous government conduct claim, or
something else altogether?
If the perjury trap is entrapment, then the claim seems doomed to failure
absent a prosecutor telling a witness to lie. In almost all cases, the defendant
will have a choice whether to lie, testify truthfully, or assert her Fifth
Amendment privilege before the grand jury. However, as the Supreme Court
noted in United States v. Mandujano,1" while a witness called to testify before
a grand jury is "free at every stage to interpose his constitutional privilege
against self-incrimination... perjury was not a permissible option." '176 In a
similar vein, the Court stated in Nix v. Whiteside"' that "[w]hatever the scope
of a constitutional right to testify, it is elementary that such a right does not
extend to testifying falsely."'78 Because witnesses are required to testify
truthfully, a prosecutor's decision to call a witness before the grand jury would
not likely be an inducement to criminal conduct. Even a defendant who knows
that she is likely to be indicted may not commit perjury,179 so the witness's
knowledge of the government's reason for seeking the testimony is irrelevant
to whether the government acted improperly.
If there remains any meaning to the outrageous government conduct claim,
it too is an unlikely basis for defending against perjury charges. If the grand
jury is validly constituted and the subject matter of the witness's testimony
within its jurisdiction, then the prosecutor's motives are irrelevant. Since
Costello, lower courts cannot review the grand jury's reception of evidence and
Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Activism or Interpretation?, 44 WAYNE L. REV. 1519, 1553
(1998) ("[M]anipulation of the Guidelines goes beyond interpreting the Guidelines to materially
rewriting them-a power that has been specifically delegated to the [Sentencing] Commission
and not to the judiciary.").
175. 425 U.S. 564 (1976).
176. Id, at 584.
177. 475 U.S. 157 (1986).
178. Id. at 158 (emphasis added).
179. See United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 189 (1977) ("It is firmly settled
that the prospect of being indicted does not entitle a witness to commit perjury .... ).
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decision to indict. An outrageous government conduct claim based on the
prosecution impermissibly creating a perjury trap is just such a review that
looks at the type of evidence received by the grand jury and its reasons for
finding probable cause.'80 The prosecutor's conduct is not subject to any more
review than the grand jury's, so whatever life the outrageous government
conduct claim might have, it appears to be completely inapplicable to conduct
before the grand jury.
A pejury trap claim is really a defendant's explanation for lying that seeks
to explain it away by focusing attention on the questioner. The stumbling block
is that those who testify falsely work a significant harm by interfering with the
investigatory process; thus prosecutors bringing perjury charges are protecting
an important function of the criminal justice system. The perjury trap claim
reflects the fundamental problem with the outrageous government conduct
claim. For all its appeal as a means to protect against the truly egregious case
of governmental overreaching, relying on due process gives courts a
"chancellor's foot veto" to impose their own view of what is permissible in
conducting an investigation. The irony is obvious-a test tracing its origins to
the "objective" view of entrapment is at its core an expression of the subjective
view ofjudges. A prosecutor's decision to compel a witness to appear before
a grand jury, if the subsequent false testimony is used to convict the witness of
perjury, is not somehow made wrongful because a judge believed it to be
improper. Perjury statutes provide a basis to defend against the indictment on
the ground of materiality,' and a defendant can raise the entrapment defense
at trial, even if she is unlikely to succeed.'82 Moreover, the Constitution
furnishes important constraints on the investigatory phase of a case, through the
protections of the Fourth Amendment for searches and seizures and the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. When the government uses
the tools provided to investigate criminal activity, their use in a legal manner
seems to comport with due process, not contravene it. Due process should not
180. See, e.g., Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363 (1956) ("An indictment
returned by a legally constituted and unbiased grand jury, like an information drawn by the
prosecutor, if valid on its face, is enough to call for trial of the charge on the merits.").
181. For example, the federal perjury statute covers any person who testifies or
submits a written declaration under oath that "states or subscribes any material matter which he
does not believe to be true." 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1994) (emphasis added). Similarly, the common
law of perjury incorporated materiality as an element of the crime. See Lisa C. Harris, Note,
Perjury Defeats Justice, 42 WAYNE L. REV. 1755, 1761 (1996).
182. Even if the defense does not meet the technical requirements for entrapment, an
appeal to the jury's sympathy by portraying the government as pursuing an unfair course of
conduct is not impossible. The Independent Prosecutor's prosecution of Julie Hyatt Steele on
obstruction of justice and false statement charges, relating to the investigation of President
Clinton's alleged sexual harassment of a female staff member, involved the defense assertion in
closing argument that the defendant "was an innocent victim of [Independent Counsel] Starr's
determination to pursue the President." Leef Smith & Patricia Davis, Jury Deadlocks on Steele
Charges; Mistrial Is 2nd Recent Setbackfor Starr in White House Probe, WASH. POST, May 8,
1999, at A7.
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supply a separate standard of conduct that can transform a prosecutor's
otherwise permissible actions into a violation of the defendant's constitutional
rights.
D. The Right to a Grand Jury Indictment
The Supreme Court in Russell announced that there might one day be a
case in which outrageous government conduct would require dismissal of an
indictment. 8 3 In much the same fashion, whileMechanik, Bank ofNova Scotia,
and Williams eliminated supervisory power as a means of policing
prosecutorial conduct before the grand jury, the Court did not renounce entirely
the authority to provide a remedy in a case involving prosecutorial misconduct.
For example, in Bank ofNova Scotia the Court preserved at least the glimmer
of judicial review of misconduct affecting the grand jury's decision to indict
when it stated: "Finally, we note that we are not faced with a history of
prosecutorial misconduct, spanning several cases, that is so systematic and
pervasive as to raise a substantial and serious question about the fundamental
fairness of the process which resulted in the indictment.""' Just like its dictum
in Russell, the Court could not forswear at least the appearance of having a role
in reviewing a federal prosecutor's conduct before the grand jury, even while
observing that such "systematic and pervasive" abuse was not present in Bank
of Nova Scotia.
Similarly, in Williams the Court asserted that its analysis in Bank ofNova
Scotia
makes clear that the supervisory power can be used to dismiss
an indictment because of misconduct before the grand jury,
at least where that misconduct amounts to a violation of one
of those "few, clear rules which were carefully drafted and
approved by this Court and by Congress to ensure the
integrity of the grand jury's functions."'185
Williams eliminated the federal judiciary's authority to prescribe rules of
conduct for prosecutors appearing before the grand jury, so the supervisory
power noted by the Court must be so limited that it would only apply to
violations undermining the essential function of the grand jury itself. If that is
the extent of the judiciary's authority, then it is no different from the Fifth
Amendment's requirement that the defendant be indicted by an unbiased grand
183. 411 U.S. 423, 431 (1973).
184. 487 U.S. 250,259 (1988).
185. 504 U.S. 36, 46 (1992) (quoting United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 74
(1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
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jury. 186
The only real constraint on prosecutorial conduct before the grand jury is
not the judiciary's supervisory power or the outrageous government conduct
claim under due process (Williams's statementnotwithstanding) but instead the
constitutional guarantee that the defendant be indicted by a grand jury for all
capital and other infamous crimes.'87 Costello ruled out any inquiry into the
substance of the grand jury's decision to indict so long as it was an "indictment
returned by a legally constituted and unbiased grand jury... ."18 The Court
has held that when "the structural protections of the grand jury have been so
compromised as to render the proceedings fundamentally unfair," then a court
can presume prejudice.'89 Exclusion of citizens from service on a grand jury on
the basis of race or sex comprises the type of structural flaw that permits a
presumption of prejudice requiring dismissal of an indictment, without
prejudice to reindictment of the defendant by a properly constituted grand
jury.'90 For the type of violation described in Bank ofNova Scotia and Williams
to permit dismissal of the indictment, the prosecutor's actions must have
undermined the independence of the grand jury to such a degree that its
probable cause determination was not the result of a detached review of the
evidence, but instead only a forfeiture of its authority to the government.91
When is a grand jury no longer independent of the prosecutor? A court
186. Some lower court opinions appear to blend supervisory power and grand jury
independence analysis. In United States v. Martin, 480 F. Supp. 880 (S.D. Tex. 1979), a district
court dismissed an indictment in part because "this Court strongly feels that the indicting grand
jury here was used to rubber stamp the wishes of the prosecutors in derogation of its duty to
stand as an independent body placed between the prosecutor and the accused." Id. at 886. In
United States v. Gold, 470 F. Supp. 1336 (N.D. Ill. 1979), the district court dismissed the
indictment based in part on the ground that the prosecutor apparently showed a copy of the
indictment signed by the United States Attorney to the grand jurors before they voted, noting that
"[t]his kind of conduct by government attorneys makes a mockery of the grand jury system." Id.
at 1355. In neither Martin nor Gold, both decided before Hasting, did the district courts focus
on whether the prosecutors' conduct prejudiced the defendant. The approach that addresses
primarily the government's misconduct is closer to supervisory power or outrageous government
conduct than a Fifth Amendment analysis that considers the independence of the grand jury.
187. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall beheld to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury .....
188. 350 U.S. 359, 363 (1956) (emphasis added).
189. Bank of Nova Scotia, 487 U.S. at 257.
190. See, e.g., Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986) (dismissing indictment due
to exclusion from serving on grand jury on the basis of race); Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S.
187 (1946) (dismissing indictment due to exclusion of women from grand jury service).
191. See United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 719 F.2d 1386, 1391 (9th Cir. 1983)
("Dismissal of an indictment is . . . warranted on constitutional grounds if prosecutorial
misconduct has undermined the grand jury's ability to make an informed and objective
evaluation of the evidence presented to it."); see also United States v. Red Elk, 955 F. Supp.
1170, 1182-83 n.12 (D.S.D. 1997) ("[I]t appears that the right to unbiased treatment by a grand
jury is really one grounded in the Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Because the grand
jury's determination is a preliminary one... courts have not been inclined to extend due process
rights to grand jury proceedings.").
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trying to answer that question must confront Costello's admonition that a
facially valid indictment precludes judicial review of the quality of the evidence
on which the grand jury relied to decide probable cause. If the sufficiency of
the evidence cannotbe examined, then the determination of independence must
involve a review of the prosecutor's conduct in the actual grand jury
proceeding. In United States v. Breslin"2 the district court dismissed an
indictment without prejudice because "misconduct from the first day the grand
jury met continuing through the day the superseding indictment was presented"
compromised the integrity of the grand jury.'93 The court identified a number
of instances of prosecutorial misconduct, including statements which implied
that the grand jury needed to act quickly to avoid the expiration of the statute
of limitations and that the grand jurors need not agree to everything in the
indictment, only the "critical" parts.'94 The court included as a factual basis for
dismissing the indictment the fact that the prosecutor provided donuts to the
grand jurors at their first meeting, an act characterized as a technique "to curry
favor with the grand jurors and lead them to abrogate their role as unbiased
factfinders."'' s Prosecutorial pressure to respond quickly might constitute a
basis to question a grand jury's independence, but bringing a box of donuts is
not the type of threat to grand jury independence that creates a "grave doubt"
about the decision to indict. Yet, the question of independence has to be free
from reviewing the manner in which the prosecutor gathered and presented
evidence to the grand jury, so courts trying to assess whether the prosecutor
acted properly are left with such crumbs to make their decision.'96
The Fifth Amendment grand jury right, which is not applicable to the
states, 197 prevents overt usurpation of the grand jury's function by the
prosecutor. Regardless of the prosecutor's intent, undermining the
independence of the grand jury means that the defendant should not have been
indicted for the crime by that body. Yet, an allegation that prosecutorial
misconduct resulted in a breakdown in the grand jury's proper functioning
should not provide a backdoor means for courts to impose rules to constrain
prosecutorial conduct under the rubric of finding that the prosecutor
compromised the grand jury's independence. A court cannot, for example,
conclude that the government's failure to furnish exculpatory evidence to the
192. 916 F. Supp. 438 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
193. Id. at 446.
194. Id. at 442.
195. Id. at 443.
196. Dismissal of the indictment on Fifth Amendment grounds does not end the case,
however, because another grandjury untainted by the prosecutorial misconduct can reindict the
defendant, as happened in Breslin. See United States v. Breslin (Breslin II), No. 95-cr-202, 1997
WL 50422, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 7, 1997) (denying defendant's motion to dismiss indictment
returned after dismissal of previous indictment due to Fifth Amendment violation).
197. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884) (concluding that Due
Process Clause does not require the states to charge a defendant by a grand jury indictment even
if the crime is "infamous").
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grand jurors undermined the structural independence of the grand jury' 9 -that
approach simply bypasses the Supreme Court's limitations on the use of
supervisory power by attaching a different label to the court's action.
The judiciary's need to assert that it retains at least some residual authority
to review the conduct of the prosecutor in the grand jury is the reason why the
Court acknowledged inBankofNova Scotia and Williams that recurrent abuses
of the grand jury process can empower the judiciary to put a halt to
prosecutorial misconduct. The source of that authority is unclear, given the
Court's rejection of supervisory power as a means to police conduct occurring
outside the direct purview of the judiciary. Like Russell, the Court's dictum
regarding this residual authority protects it from having to disavow any
possibility of reviewing the conduct of prosecutors. However, that authority-if
it can even be called that-is quite limited because the Court does not permit
judicial inquiry into the prosecutor's conduct before the grand jury or permit
judges to exercise a "chancellor's foot veto" over the government because of
its attorney's motives or tactics, absent a separate constitutional violation.
IV. CONTROLLING PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT THROUGH SUBSEQUENT
PROCEEDINGS
The Supreme Court has eliminated direct judicial review of prosecutorial
misconduct in the proceeding in which the misconduct occurred. Ifa grand jury
indicts a defendant, the only means of seeking vindication is a trial in which a
jury or a judge determines whether the government introduced proof beyond
a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed a crime. Until recently, a
defendant that believed she had been prosecuted unfairly and was found not
guilty had no civil remedy, such as a damages action, to challenge the
prosecutor's conduct. While an aggrieved defendant can pursue the common
law tort of malicious prosecution against a complaining witness or police
officer that fabricated evidence, prosecutors are absolutely immune from civil
liability for initiating and pursuing the case. 99 Similarly, state and federal
prosecutors have absolute immunity from constitutional tort actions arising
from their conduct in the judicial phase of a case, which includes all conduct
before the grand jury.200 As members of the bar, prosecutors are subject to the
198. See, e.g., Breslin If, 1997 WL 50422, at *10 (citing United States v. Williams,
504 U.S. 36, 52 (1992), for this proposition).
199. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFToRTs § 656 (1977) ("A public prosecutor acting
in his official capacity is absolutely privileged to initiate, institute, or continue criminal
proceedings.").
200. The Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994), provides a remedy
against state officials who violate aperson's federal constitutional or statutory rights. Prosecutors
historically have absolute immunity from civil actions resulting from their misconduct; however,
the scope of this absolute immunity is limited. See Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 129-31
(1997) (noting that a prosecutor's conduct in the preparation and filing of documents was
protected by absolute immunity under § 1983, but holding that a prosecutor was not entitled to
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disciplinary rules of the state in which they are admitted to practice, but bar
proceedings do not provide any direct compensation to a vindicated defendant.
Proposals to reform the grand jury focus largely on ways to lessen the
prosecutor's control over the proceeding as an indirect means of addressing
prosecutorial misconduct. One recommendation is to give the grand jurors
independent legal counsel and thereby eliminate the jury's reliance on the
prosecutor's legal advice-advice possibly tied to the prosecutor's stake in the
outcome of the proceeding.2"' The thought is that an attorney with no ties to the
prosecutor's office will guide the grand jury to a fairer charging decision.
Senator Bumpers submitted two bills in 1998 that would have amended the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to permit subpoenaed witnesses to have
their own attorneys present in the grand jury room, the theory being that the
outside attorney would monitor the prosecutor's conduct.2" Even before the
Supreme Court's decision in Williams, Professor Peter Arenella advocated
requiring prosecutors to submit exculpatory evidence to the grand jury. 3
The problem with reforms that seek to empower the grand jurors to act
independently of the prosecutor is twofold. First, they reflect at least an implicit
assumption that lessening the prosecutor's role in the grand jury process will
result in fewer-or perhaps better-indictments, which in turn is considered a
benefit to the criminal justice system. This assumption reflects a view that a
absolute immunity where she made an affirmation of a fact in order to establish probable cause);
Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259,272-73 (1993) (stating that prosecutors are entitled only
to qualified immunity when performing administrative or investigatory duties that do not relate
to preparing for initiation ofprosecution, and absolute immunity is reserved for the prosecutor's
role as advocate for the state); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 (1976) (holding that
a prosecutor who acted within the scope of his duties in initiating and pursuing a criminal
prosecution and in presenting the state's case was absolutely immune from civil suit for damages
under § 1983 for alleged deprivations of the accused's constitutional rights); Morley v. Walker,
175 F.3d 756, 759 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that when a prosecutor is engaged in "traditional
prosecutorial functions"--those activities closely associated with the judicial phase of the
criminal process-then absolute immunity will prevail; however, if the activities are merely
administrative or investigatory, then qualified immunity reigns.).
201. See Rende B. Lettow, Note, Reviving Federal Grand Jury Presentments, 103
YALE L.J. 1333, 1361 (1994) ("An important reason why the grand jury has lost ground
compared to judges, prosecutors, and legislators is its lack of staff. Counsel is particularly
important."); see also Beall, supra note 21, at 636 ("[S]pecial grand juries should be provided
with counsel, a 'jury clerk' much like the current judicial clerk.").
202. S. 2289, 105th Cong. § 2 (1998); S. 2030, 105th Cong. § 2 (1998); see Hafetz
& Pellettieri, supra note 23, at 14 (advocating that witnesses be permitted to have counsel in the
grand jury proceedings). Representing the contrary view, Earl Silbert, a former United States
Attorney for the District of Columbia, assailed an earlier ABA proposal to permit witnesses to
bring their counsel into the grand jury proceeding. Wary of abuses by defense attorneys in
unmonitored proceedings and apprehensive of conflicts created by attorneys representing
multiple parties before the same grand jury, Silbert argued that "[t]he danger to the grand jury's
truth seeking, investigative function is far too great." Earl J. Silbert, Defense Counsel in the
Grand Jury-The Answer to the White Collar Criminal's Prayers, 15 AM. CRIM. L. Rlv. 293,
300 (1978).
203. See Arenella, supra note 19, at 565-69.
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properly functioning body would issue fewer indictments. However, simply
producing a lower indictment rate would not address the problem of
prosecutorial misconduct in the grand jury. Moreover, making the process more
formal, by giving a grand jury separate legal counsel and requiring the
introduction of certain types of information, would slow the process without
demonstrably decreasing the possibility that the grand jury would indict an
innocent person. Reducing the likelihood of an indictment or limiting the
efficacy of the grand jury as an investigative tool would certainly be appealing
to targets of investigations, but such changes would not necessarily be positive
developments in the criminal process.2
The second problem with the suggested reforms that focus on refining the
grand jury's accusatory role is that they ignore the core issue of making
prosecutors accountable for their misconduct. Prosecutorial control of the
investigation, standing alone, is not inherently problematic, even in a system
in which the Supreme Court has precluded judicial review of the grand jury's
investigatory and accusatory functions. The possibility of misuse of that
authority, however, requires that there be some means ofjudicial scrutiny that
does not automatically provide every defendant with a vehicle to challenge the
government's conduct. As the Supreme Court's decisions since Costello
demonstrate, seeking judicial review of the grand jury investigation can
devolve into a tactic to delay the prosecution of valid criminal charges.20 The
criminal justice system is already rife with procedural delays, and providing a
means for a defendant to further prolong the proceedings does not make the
grand jury right any more meaningful.
In the past two years, Congress has enacted two laws that address the issue
of prosecutorial misconduct. The first was the Hyde Amendment,206 which
gives vindicated defendants in federal prosecutions the right to seek attorney's
fees from the government. The second was the McDade Act,207 which makes
federal prosecutors subject to the disciplinary rules in every state in which they
practice. These two acts are first steps that, while flawed in some ways, provide
an avenue to address prosecutorial misconduct claims in a proceeding separate
from the underlying criminal prosecution. These provisions are certainly not
the final, nor even the best, methods to address the problem of prosecutorial
misconduct. But they do indicate how Congress and the state legislatures
should approach the issue.
204. See Leipold, supra note 24, at 313 ("If we accept that grand jury proceedings
will never resemble a full trial-and more specifically, will never be adversarial-there is little
chance that they will ever be a meaningful deterrent to the prosecutor.").
205. See Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250,254-65 (1988); United
States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 185-88 (1976); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 1-18
(1972).
206. Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 617, 111 Stat. 2440, 2519 (1997) (to be codified at 18
U.S.C. § 3006A).
207. Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 801(a), 112 Stat. 2681 (1998) (to be codified at28 U.S.C.
§ 530B).
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A. The Hyde Amendment
At the urging of Representative Henry Hyde, chair of the House Judiciary
Committee, Congress enacted a provision that, for the first time in criminal
prosecutions, permits a defendant vindicated after an indictment to seek
recovery of attorney's fees. The proposal originated in a bill that would have
allowed members of Congress and their respective staffs to recover their
attorney's fees following a criminal acquittal. That bill grew out of
dissatisfaction with the prosecution of Representative Joseph McDade." 8
However, Representative Hyde offered a program that went beyond just
providing compensation to members and staff ofthe legislative branch; Hyde's
proposal offered to pay the attorney's fees of any "prevailing party" in any case
in which the government's position was not "substantially justified."2 9 The
"substantially justified" standard came from the Equal Access to Justice Act
(EAJA), which permits private parties to recover attorney's fees in civil
litigation in which they prevail over the federal government, "unless the court
finds that the position of the United States was substantiallyjustified ....
Representative Hyde argued in favor of his bill that "[i]t may be rough justice,
but it is substantial justice. That is what we are attempting to do."21'
The House of Representatives added Hyde's proposal as an amendment to
a larger budget bill. After both chambers passed the bill, a Conference
Committee reconciled the differences in the legislation, including a substantial
revision of the fee-shifting provision. The most important change to emerge
from the legislative compromise was the adoption of a different standard for
recovery by defendants in criminal cases, requiring the claimant to prove that
the government's position was "vexatious, frivolous, or inbad fath... .22 The
final version of the provision provides as follows:
During fiscal year 1998 and in any fiscal year thereafter, the
court, in any criminal case (other than a case in which the
208. See 143 CONG. REc. H7791 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1997) (statement of Rep. Hyde)
("Now, in the bill, the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Murtha] having in mind the case of
someone we all know who went through hell, if I may use the term, for many years of being
accused and finally prevailed at enormous expense, one he will never get out from under .... ")
(referring to the prosecution of Rep. McDade); cf. Bill Moushey, Murtha Seeking Prosecutor
Limits, Prrrs. POST-GAzETtE, Feb. 3, 1999, at Al (discussing Rep. Murtha's "assault on
overzealous and lawbreaking officials in the U.S Department of Justice. . ." after the acquittal
of Rep. McDade on bribery and RICO charges).
209. H.R. 2267, 105th Cong. § 616 (1997). Rep. Hyde said about the bill, "First of
all, it is too narrow. It only covers Congressmen and congressional staff. If it is good enough for
them, it ought to be good enough for any citizen." 143 CONG. REc. H7791 (daily ed. Sept. 24,
1997) (statement of Rep. Hyde).
210. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1994) (emphasis added).
211. 143 CONG. REc. H7791 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1997) (statement of Rep. Hyde).
212. Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 617, 111 Stat. 2440, 2519 (1997) (to be codified at 18
U.S.C. § 3006A (Supp. 1998)).
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defendant is represented by assigned counsel paid for by the
public) pending on or after the date of the enactment of this
Act, may award to a prevailing party, other than the United
States, a reasonable attorney's fee and other litigation
expenses, where the court finds that the position of the United
States was vexatious, frivolous, or in bad faith, unless the
court finds that special circumstances make such an award
unjust. Such awards shall be granted pursuant to the
procedures and limitations (but not the burden of proof)
provided for an award under section 2412 of title 28, United
States Code. To determine whether or not to award fees and
costs under this section, the court, for good cause shown, may
receive evidence ex parte and in camera (which shall include
the submission of classified evidence or evidence that reveals
or might reveal the identity of an informant or undercover
agent or matters occurring before a grand jury) and evidence
or testimony so received shall be kept under seal. Fees and
other expenses awarded under this provision to a party shall
be paid by the agency over which the party prevails from any
funds made available to the agency by appropriation. No new
appropriations shall be made as a result of this provision."3
The Hyde Amendment, which relies on the procedures of the EAJA for
determining whether adefendantis qualified to seek reimbursement,1 does not
213. Id.
214. The procedural requirements for filing a claim under the EAJA are as follows:
A party seeking an award of fees and other expenses
shall, within thirty days of final judgment in the
action, submit to the court an application for fees and
other expenses which shows that the party is a
prevailing party and is eligible to receive an award
under this subsection, and the amount sought,
including an itemized statement from any attorney or
expert witness representing or appearing in behalf of
the party stating the actual time expended and the rate
at which fees and other expenses were computed.
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B) (1994). The EAJA generally caps the attorney's fees at $125 perhour,
§ 2412(d)(2)(A)(ii) (Supp. 1998), and limits who can seek recovery based on the financial assets
of the claimant:
(2) For the purposes of this subsection-
(B) "party" means (i) an individual whose net worth
did not exceed $2,000,000 at the time the civil action
was filed, or (ii) any owner of an unincorporated
business, or anypartnership, corporation, association,
unit of local government, or organization, the net
worth of which did not exceed $7,000,000 at the time
the civil action was filed, and which had not more
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permit a claim for damages against an individual prosecutor. In that sense, it
retains the common law immunity provided to prosecutors for the tort of
malicious prosecution. On the other hand, the provision allows recovery in a
broader range of cases than would be available for the common law tort, which
requires that the acquitted defendant prove that there was no probable cause to
support the prosecution." s The Conference Report accompanying the resolution
that included the Hyde Amendment asserts that "[t]he conferees understand that
a grand jury finding of probable cause to support an indictment does not
preclude a judge from finding that the government's position was vexatious,
frivolous or in bad faith."2"' While the Supreme Court in Costello prevented
judicial inquiry into the adequacy of the evidence for an indictment, the
congressional intent in approving the new fee-shifting regime adopts a parallel
approach by preventing the issuance of a grand jury indictment from
foreclosing judicial inquiry into the propriety of the government's conduct.
Were it otherwise, the Hyde Amendment would be a nullity because the mere
than 500 employees at the time the civil action was
filed; except that an organization described in
§ 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (26
U.S.C. 501(c)(3)) exempt from taxation under section
501(a) of such Code, or a cooperative association as
defined in section 15(a) of the Agricultural Marketing
Act (12 U.S.C. 1141j(a)), may be a party regardless
of the net worth of such organization or cooperative
association orforpurposes of subsection (d)(1)(D), a
small entity as defined in section 601 of Title 5 ....
§ 2412(d)(2)(B) (Supp. 1998). Unlike most civil cases, in which a private party pays its own
costs for asserting a claim or defending against the government's action, criminal prosecutions
sometimes involve both a corporation and its officers or directors as defendants, or conduct by
individuals on behalf of the entity. In those situations, the corporation often undertakes the
obligation to pay the attorney's fees of the individuals, and the articles of incorporation and the
bylaws may make the payment of such costs mandatory. For example, Delaware law provides:
To the extent that a present or former director or
officer of a corporation has been successful on the
merits or otherwise in defense of any action, suit or
proceeding.., or in defense of any claim, issue or
matter therein, such person shall be indemnified
against expenses (including attorney's fees) actually
and reasonably incurred....
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(c) (Supp. 1998) (emphasis added). An interesting question under
the Hyde Amendment will be whether those officers who have the right to payment of their legal
costs by the corporation could first seek recovery from the government, and then seek
reimbursement from the corporation of any costs not covered by the Hyde Amendment award.
If an individual would have qualified under the EAJA standards to recover attorney's fees, but
the corporation would not have, the corporation could seek recovery by taking over the claim
of the individual defendant vindicated in the prosecution under a subrogation theory. Another
approach may be for a corporation to condition its payment of attorney's fees for an officer on
the individual defendant's agreement to pursue a Hyde Amendment claim and use any recovery
to repay the corporation.
215. See 52 AM. JUR. 2D Malicious Prosecution § 6 (1970).
216. H.R.REP.No. 105-405, at 194 (1997).
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fact of a valid indictment would prevent any claim for attorney's fees.
Unfortunately, the Conference Report's negative reference to the effect of
a grand jury indictment is the only guidance in the legislative history on the
meaning of the statute. The remainder of the Report's discussion of the new
provision simply reiterates the language of the statute, and the floor debate
concerned the earlier version of the bill that would have permitted recovery
whenever the government's position was not "substantially justified." ' 7 While
Representative Hyde's floor statements advocated his proposal to transplant the
EAJA to the criminal arena, the compromise version of the statute that emerged
from the Conference Committee contains significant changes that make it quite
different from the EAJA civil fee-shifting provision. The most important
revision was the movement from the EAJA requirement of a "substantially
justified" basis for the suit to a determination of whether the government's
position was "vexatious, frivolous, or in bad faith.""2 8 Moreover, the new
provision shifts the burden of proof to the party seeking attorney's fees to
demonstrate that the government's conduct meets-orperhaps more accurately
falls below-the statutory standard, so that the prosecution begins with a
presumption of regularity despite the defendant having prevailed in the criminal
case. The legislative history is barren of any direct reference to what constitutes
conduct or a position that is vexatious, frivolous, or in bad faith. While
Representative Hyde's floor statements on the need for a fee-shifting provision
show congressional awareness of the rationale for the law, they are not helpful
for interpreting the meaning of the terms because that language was not at
issue. Congress effectively delegated to the courts the responsibility for
defining the parameters of the new statute, especially the determination of what
types of misconduct meet the standard for an award of attorney's fees.
Only a handful of cases have considered attorney's fees claims under the
Hyde Amendment, but they show a clear trend toward a flexible, wide-ranging
interpretation of what types of conduct can be considered for an award of
attorney's fees. While the language of the statute applies to the government's
"position" in "any criminal case,"2 9 preindictment conduct of both the
prosecutor and investigators has been reviewed under a Hyde Amendment
claim even though it precedes the commencement of formal criminal
proceedings. For example, in United States v. Holland?0 the district court
assessed the vexations or frivolous nature of the government's claim from the
time of a criminal referral by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to the
United States Attorney." In awarding over $500,000 in attorney's fees to the
defendants, the district court found that the decision to pursue the criminal case
217. 143 CONG. REc. H7791 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1997) (statement of Rep. Hyde).
218. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (Supp. 1998).
219. Id.
220. 34 F. Supp. 2d 346 (E.D. Va.), vacated in part on reconsideration by 48 F. Supp.
2d 571 (E.D. Va. 1999).
221. Id. at 364.
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was politically motivated and that the prosecution should not have relied on the
testimony of its principal witness, who the court found to be "incredible as a
matter of law." '222 Similarly, in United States v. Gardner" the trial court
considered the conduct ofboth the prosecutor and the Internal Revenue Service
in the course of an investigation of the defendant in deciding the request for
attorney's fees. 4 Trial conduct, involving the prosecutor's failure to disclose
exculpatory evidence to the defendant as required by the Due Process Clause,'
was the basis for an award of attorney's fees in United States v. Ranger
Communications, Inc.226
The Hyde Amendment does not permit defendants to recover whenever a
jury or judge finds in their favor, although that is certainly a precondition for
a successful motion. 27 The vindicated defendant must go a step further by
demonstrating misconduct by the prosecutor or investigator that substantially
affected the decision to proceed with the case or that infected the proceedings.
Prosecutorial misconduct is not limited to intentional actions, and the statutory
standard is broad enough to encompass grossly negligent conduct. The Hyde
Amendment is not limited to situations that would meet the requirements of the
tort of malicious prosecution, such as requiring proof of a lack of probable
cause to indict or of actual malice, although evidence along those lines would
go a long way toward demonstrating the government's position was vexatious,
frivolous, or in bad faith. Moreover, the timing of the misconduct, whether it
occurs before or after an indictment, should be irrelevant to a Hyde
Amendment claim once the defendant has been vindicated. The Conference
Committee Report indicates that Congress did not view an otherwise valid
grand jury indictment as precluding recovery,2" so it would be illogical to look
only at the prosecutor's conduct after that point in deciding whether to award
attorney's fees.
While the standard is flexible, the scope of the Hyde Amendment needs to
be worked out carefully by the courts, which must be mindful not to interfere
in grand jury investigations. In that regard, one interpretive issue courts must
address is determining whether a claimant is a "prevailing party" in a "criminal
222. Id. at 366 n.34. The judge granted the defendant's motion for a judgment of
acquittal at the end of the prosecution's case. Id. at 375.
223. 23 F. Supp. 2d 1283 (N.D. Okla. 1998).
224. Id. at 1294-95. The court found that the defendant had established a sufficient
basis to order discovery of the government's reasons for proceeding with an indictment, which
the court dismissed with prejudice before trial due to a lack of sufficient evidence. Id. at 1296-
97.
225. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
226. 22 F. Supp. 2d 667, 676 (W.D. Mich. 1998).
227. See United States v. Reyes, 16 F. Supp. 2d 759, 761 (S.D. Tex. 1998) (granting
summary judgment to government when "[a]t most, [defendant] relies on the Court's granting
of the judgment of acquittal as support for his motion for attorney's fees."); United States v.
Triosi, 13 F. Supp. 2d 595, 597 (N.D. W. Va. 1998) ("[A]cquittal alone does not automatically
entitle [defendant] to compensation under the statutory scheme.").
228. 143 CONG. REc. H7791 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1997).
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attorney's fees for subjects of grand jury investigations, as it did under the
Independent Counsel law for those that were not indicted. 6 The Hyde
Amendment authorizes a form of judicial review of the prosecutor's conduct
in the grand jury, but it does not appear from the language of the statute that
Congress intended to create a means for courts to engage in that type of review
during an investigation, or when the grand jury does not act. Indeed, if the
grand jury decides not to indict or the prosecutor discontinues an investigatibn,
these actions indicate quite the opposite of the situation the Hyde Amendment
addresses, which is prosecutorial misconduct. Allowing an application for
attorney's fees when the prosecutor or grand jury exercises its discretion not to
pursue a criminal case creates an odd incentive that encourages a prosecutor to
pursue a questionable case by seeking an indictment, or drop an investigation
at an early stage if there is any question that it may not be fruitful. The
congressional scheme should not be interpreted to discourage reasonable law
enforcement efforts, but should provide a means to police prosecutorial
misconduct that falls to the level of being "vexatious, frivolous or in bad
faith."
237
Claims under the Hyde Amendment to this point have generally involved
white collar criminal charges, including bank fraud,23' import violations,23'
236. The Independent Counsel law provides as follows:
Upon the request of an individual who is the subject
of an investigation conducted by an independent
counsel pursuant to this chapter, the division of the
court may, if no indictment is brought against such
individual pursuant to that investigation, award
reimbursement for those reasonable attorney's fees
incurred by that individual during that investigation
which would not have been incurred but for the
requirements of this chapter. The division of the court
shall notify the the [sic] independent counsel who
conducted the investigation and Attorney General of
any request for attorney's fees under this subsection.
28 U.S.C. § 593 (f)(1) (1994). Attorney's fees are only permitted if the defendant is not indicted
by the grand jury. In re North, 37 F.3d 663, 664 (D.C. Cir. 1994). A person who received a
presidential pardon after being indicted could not seek attorney's fees under the law. In re
North, 62 F.3d 1434, 1438 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Under this fee provision, over four million dollars
has been awarded for attorney's fees. Kathleen Clark, Paying the Price for Heightened Ethics
Scrutiny: Legal Defense Funds and Other Ways That Government Officials Pay Their Lawyers,
50 STAN. L. REv. 65, 106 (1997). Prior to the adoption of the Hyde Amendment, Congress
authorized the payment ofattorney's fees to a defendant acquitted of charges related to the White
House Travel Office. See Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-
208, § 526, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (approving payment of $500,000 for legal fees of Billy Dale
and five other former employees of Travel Office).
237. Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 617, 111 Stat. 2440, 2519 (1997) (to be codified at 18
U.S.C. § 3006A).
238. United States v. Holland, 34 F. Supp. 2d 346 (E.D. Va. 1999).
239. United States v. Ranger Elec. Communications, Inc., 22 F. Supp. 2d 667 (W.D.
Mich. 1998).
[Vol. 5 1: 1
1999] PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN GRAND JURY INVESTIGATIONS 53
case.'2 9 The EAJA only defines the term "prevailing party" with reference to
an eminent domain action," ° and the statute provides no definition of "criminal
case." While most cases will be clear because a defendant was acquitted or the
court dismissed the charges, an open issue under the Hyde Amendment is
whether it applies only to those who have been vindicated after an indictment,
which is the point at which the formal criminal proceeding begins. For
example, suppose that a person who was the target of a grand jury investigation
incurred attorney's fees, and the government subsequently decided not to
pursue the case or the grand jury refused to indict the person. In In re Grand
Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum (Viglianco),"' the district court held that a motion
to quash a grand jury subpoena was a "criminal case" within the meaning of the
Hyde Amendment, although it refused to award attorney's fees because the
government's position did not meet the statutory standard.232
Viglianco's extension of the Hyde Amendment 3 is troublesome, and
probably wrong. Congress adopted the attorney's fee provision not only to give
vindicated defendants a means of redress, but also to police prosecutorial
misconduct by holding it up to the light ofjudicial scrutiny after the completion
of the criminal process. The Hyde Amendment is consistent with the Supreme
Court's approach to grand jury investigations in cases beginning with
Costello." That approach has consistently been to admonish courts not to
interfere in the grand jury's investigative function by reviewing the
prosecutor's conduct. Just as CostelloS and its progeny deny defendants a
means to challenge the prosecutor's actions in gathering evidence and
presenting it to a grand jury by seeking dismissal of an indictment, so too the
Hyde Amendment only applies after the criminal process is complete, so that
judicial review is not a form of "chancellor's foot veto" over the government.
Permitting courts to consider an attorney's fee application during a grand jury
investigation is precisely the sort of judicial interference the Supreme Court
prohibited. Significantly, Congress did not clearly authorize a claim for
229. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (Supp. 1998).
230. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(H) (1994).
231. 31 F. Supp. 2d 542 (N.D. W. Va. 1998).
232. Id. at 544. In United States v. Chan, 22 F. Supp. 2d 1123 (D. Haw. 1998), the
district court relied on the Hyde Amendment as an alternative to the EAJA in awarding
attorney's fees to a claimant seeking restitution that had been ordered in a criminal case, which
the government refused to pay. Id. at 1127 n.3. A claim against the government seeking payment
of funds turned over by a defendant to the government is clearly a civil action, not a "criminal
case," and therefore subject to the EAJA. Id. at 1127. The basis on which the funds were
transferred, (i.e., restitution in a criminal prosecution) is irrelevant to the status of the claim as
a civil action, not a criminal case. Id. Moreover, the Hyde Amendment provides a vindicated
defendant, not a third-party claimant, with a means to recover attorney's fees incurred in the
prior criminal prosecution; therefore, claims under the act should not be available in forfeiture
actions.
233. 31 F. Supp. 2d at 543-44.
234. 350 U.S. 359 (1956).
235. Id.
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government program bribery,24° and tax evasion."4 These are the types of cases
in which the prosecutor plays the leading role through the use of the grand
jury's investigative authority. Importantly, the Hyde Amendment prohibits
defendants represented by appointed counsel from filing claims for attorney's
fees.242 Because appointed counsel typically represent defendants involved in
street crimes, the beneficiaries of the Hyde Amendment are more likely to be
vindicated defendants in white collar cases.243 It should not be surprising, then,
that the grand jury phase of the case has been a major subject ofjudicial review
in Hyde Amendment claims for attorney's fees.
The Hyde Amendment was the product of rather hasty congressional
action, adopted as a floor amendment with no hearings by either chamber of
Congress. Its final form was a compromise, with little discussion of the scope
240. United States v. Reyes, 16 F. Supp. 2d 759 (S.D. Tex. 1998).
241. United States v. Gardner, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1283 (N.D. Okla. 1998).
242. Hyde Amendment §617, 111 Stat. at 2519.
243. Professor Richman suggests that the grand jury secrecy provision in FED. R.
CRIM. P. 6(e), which prohibits prosecutors from disclosing any matter occurring before the grand
jury, primarily benefits the targets of white collar investigations because that is the type of case
likely to involve significant grand jury involvement in the investigative phase. See Richman,
supra note 35, at 344-45. In considering the effect of Rule 6(e), he notes:
Does it make sense to have a system that in effect
shows a special solicitude for targets and witnesses in
white collar cases? Aren't these, in fact, the cases
where, in the face of efforts by well-financed lawyers
to impede information collection, the government is
most in need of options that might include the
selective dissemination ofinvestigative data? One can
also argue that the need for prosecutors to defend an
investigation to the public while it is on-going is
likely to be greater in white-collar [crimes] than in
other contexts. After all, white collar targets are far
better able to marshal support in the press and
elsewhere than other targets-support that may
impede the progress of an investigation and/or sway
the potential jury pool.
Id. at 355.
The Hyde Amendment is different from Rule 6(e)'s disclosure prohibition in that it
is a postverdict claim, while a violation of the Rule can trigger an investigation of the prosecutor
before trial, or even before the grand jury considers an indictment. Yet, both Rule 6(e) and the
Hyde Amendment, while not specifically limited to white collar cases, are most likely to arise
in that type of case because those are the instances in which the grand jury's investigative
function will be employed, and the prosecutor will lead the investigation. In his statement on the
floor of the House of Representatives, Representative Hyde asked, "I really wish you had some
imagination and could imagine yourself getting arrested, getting indicted, what happens to your
name, to your family, and the Government has a case it cannot substantially justify." 143 CONG.
REC. H7793 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1997) (statement of Rep. Hyde). The imaginary victim of
government misconduct portrayed by Representative Hyde seems to be a member of the middle-
class, probably a professional, who is unfairly charged with a crime that does not involve drugs
or violence, but a white collar crime such as tax evasion, illegal campaign contributions, or the
like. That person is the likely recipient of the Hyde Amendment's new claim for attorney's fees.
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of the provision or the types of conduct it meant to reach. While not a model
of reflective legislation, the Hyde Amendment is largely successful in creating
a procedure for courts to review prosecutorial misconduct consistent with
protecting the investigative function of the grand jury. Congress clearly had in
mind misconduct during all phases of a criminal case, including the
investigation, when assessing whether the government's position was
vexatious, frivolous, or in bad faith. By authorizing a limited form of judicial
review, the Hyde Amendment is consonant with the Supreme Court's approach
to prosecutorial misconduct that rejects contemporaneous review during the
pendency of the criminal proceeding.
Giving courts the clear authority to assess the propriety of the prosecutor's
conduct overcomes the problem with the judicial exercise of the supervisory
power, which has permitted judges to allow their personal views to interfere
with the prosecutor's conduct of a grand jury investigation. By making
prosecutorial misconduct the focal point of the review, Congress allows courts
to exercise a limited measure of judicial review of the grand jury investigation,
among other issues, but limits that review to apost hoc assessment of the entire
case. The Hyde Amendment is consistent with, and indeed supports, the
Supreme Court's approach that limits the authority of courts to inject
themselves into an investigation while still retaining some residual authority to
exercise the power to review the government's conduct at the end of the
proceeding.
B. The McDade Act
A second legislative initiative to address prosecutorial misconduct is the
McDade Act. It makes federal prosecutors "subject to State laws and rules, and
local Federal court rules, governing attorneys in each State where such attorney
engages in that attorney's duties, to the same extent and in the same manner as
other attorneys in that State." 2" The provision is named for Representative
Joseph McDade, who was acquitted of federal criminal charges related to
campaign contributions. While his plight was the impetus for the Hyde
Amendment, Representative McDade proposed legislation even before his
acquittal to more closely regulate prosecutors. 245
244. Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 801, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998) (to be codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 530B). In the federal code, the title of this provision is "Ethical Standards for Federal
Prosecutors," although the statute only incorporates the provisions ofstate ethical codes and does
not provide a separate set of duties for federal prosecutors.
245. Representative McDade first introduced a bill to make federal prosecutors
subject to state ethical rules in the Ethical Standards for Federal Prosecutors Act of 1996. H.R.
3386, 104th Cong. (1996). He introduced the following two bills in the next Congress: (1)
Ethical Standards for Federal Prosecutors Act of 1997, H.R. 232, 105th Cong., and (2) Citizens
Protection Act of 1998, H.R. 3396, 105th Cong. The latter proposal passed as an amendment to
the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 105-
277, § 801, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998) (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 53013).
[Vol. 5 1: 1
1999] PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN GRAND JURY INVESTIGATIONS 57
Representative McDade's proposal contained a list of actions that would
subject a federal prosecutor to disciplinary action and would have established
a Misconduct Review Board with the authority to issue subpoenas to
investigate allegations of prosecutorial misconduct.2' Although the House of
Representatives passed the bill, much like the Hyde Amendment, it was
attached to a broader spending bill sent to the Senate. A compromise version
of the statute that emerged from a Conference Committee, which Congress
approved, substantially modified the original proposal.247 Congress eliminated
virtually all of the regulatory provisions except for making federal prosecutors
subject to the disciplinary rules of the states. The McDade Act is similar to the
Hyde Amendment in otherways: congressional committees never heldhearings
to consider either proposal; the floor debates on both laws dealt only with
earlier versions of the bill, so their relevance is questionable in interpreting the
statutes; and both were passed as amendments to other legislation, so
congressional consideration of the provisions was minimal. These laws, with
scant legislative history on the provisions as finally adopted by Congress, share
their origin in the congressional pique over the perceived mistreatment of
Representative McDade at the hands of federal prosecutors.24
However, the McDade Act also arose in a broader context involving the
application of state ethical rules to federal prosecutors, an issue that had been
brewing for almost ten years. In 1989, responding to concerns expressed by
federal prosecutors about the application of state ethics rules to them, Attorney
General Richard Thornburgh adopted a new policy embodied in a document
known as the "Thornburgh Memorandum." The policy purported to exempt
Department of Justice attorneys from state ethical rules that limited contacts
with persons represented by counsel, at least before the grand jury returned an
indictment. 249 The Thornburgh Memorandum sought to counter efforts by
defense lawyers to limit contacts with their clients by prosecutors and
investigators, especially in undercover operations, by invoking state ethical
rules that prohibit a lawyer from communicating "with a party he knows to be
246. H.R. 3396.
247. The House of Representatives incorporated the McDade Act into an
appropriations act. H.R. 4276, 105th Cong. § 811(a) (1998); see 144 CONG. REc. H7227
(1998).
248. The Supreme Courtrecognized inUnited States v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 501 (1972),
that prosecutorial overreaching can have "serious practical consequences when the defendant
is a Congressman. The Legislative Branch is not without weapons of its own and would no
doubt use them if it thought the Executive were unjustly harassing one of its members." Id. at
523 n. 16. The two provisions adopted by Congress in response -to the prosecution of
Representative McDade are quite mild-providing only vindicated defendants with a claim for
attorney's fees and subjecting prosecutors to no more onerous rules than those that govern the
entire legal profession-when compared to more punitive measures it might have adopted, such
as substantial budget cuts.
249. Memorandum to All Justice Department Litigators re Communications with
Persons Represented by Counsel, reprinted in In re Doe, 801 F. Supp. 478, 489-93 (D.N.M.
1992).
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represented by a lawyer in that matter unless he has the prior consent of the
lawyer representing such other party .... ." Needless to say, the response to
a policy that exempted federal prosecutors from the ethical rules of the
profession drew severe criticism."' Six years later, Attorney General Janet
Reno promulgated a rule to codify the obligations and rights of federal
prosecutors in dealing with persons represented by counsel, modifying the
scope of the Thornburgh Memorandum but, importantly, not abandoning the
basic approach of relieving government attorneys from the limitations of the
rules of the profession adopted by the states."sa Regardless of the strength of the
Department of Justice's arguments in favor of protecting its attorneys, the
visceral reaction to a policy that exempts a group of lawyers from the
profession's ethical rules was quite naturally one of suspicion and mistrust. The
backlash against the Department of Justice came in the McDade Act.s3
The McDade Act does not provide defendants with a procedure to rectify
aparticular instance ofprosecutorial misconduct, unlike the Hyde Amendment.
Instead, it subjects prosecutors to ethical provisions that may trigger
disciplinary sanctions if they engage in misconduct. There is no dispute that
prosecutors are the same as every other lawyer, and indeed operate under a
higher calling, pronounced by the Supreme Court as a duty to ensure justice.5 4
The Author has argued elsewhere that disciplinary proceedings are a good
means to police prosecutorial misconduct because the evaluation of the
government attorney's actions occurs outside the context of the underlying
criminal prosecution in which they took place. The disciplinary process is
broader than a constitutional evaluation of the prosecutor's conduct, taking into
consideration the good of the profession and the interests of society in the fair
250. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-104 (1980). The Model
Rules contain a similar restriction. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcT Rule 4.2 (1992).
251. See, e.g, In re Doe, 801 F. Supp. at 486 (stating that this policy "displays an
arrogant disregard for and irresponsibly undermines ethics in the legal profession"); Am. Bar
Ass'n Report to the House of Delegates (Feb. 12, 1990) ("[This policy is] an unwarranted and
unfounded use of executive power to create unequal classes of both litigants and lawyers.").
252. 28 C.F.R. § 77 (1998). For a thorough review of the rules and the history of the
debate over exempting federal prosecutors from state ethical rules, see Frank 0. Bowman, III,
A Bludgeon by Any OtherName: The Misuse of "EthicalRules "Against Prosecutors to Control
the Law of the State, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 665, 721-53 (1996); Jennifer Marie Buettner,
CompromisingProfessionalism: The Justice Department 'sAnti-Contact Rule, 23 J. LEGALPROF.
121, 128-131 (1999).
253. The provision did not become effective until April 19, 1999, six months after
passage of the McDade Act. Senator Hatch introduced legislation prior to the effective date to
amend the provision by exempting federal prosecutors from state ethical rules "to the extent that
the State law or rule is inconsistent with Federal law or interferes with the effectuation of Federal
law or policy, including the investigation of violations of Federal law," but the bill did not pass
the Senate. See S. 250, 106th Cong. § 2(a)(1) (1999). Even before the adoption of the McDade
Act, the Eighth Circuit struck down the Department of Justice rules on the ground that it did not
have the authority to promulgate them. United States ex rel O'Keefe v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp., 132 F.3d 1252, 1256-57 (8th Cir. 1998).
254. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
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administration of justice. Unlike judicial review of prosecutorial misconduct,
which must consider prejudice to the defendant, the state bar authorities can
look at the entire course of the proceeding to determine whether the prosecutor
met the ethical standards without regard to whether the conduct harmed the
defendant.25 To the extent the McDade Act shows a congressional intent to
encourage the use of the disciplinary process to police prosecutorial
misconduct, it is a positive development.
The problem with imposing the state rules on federal prosecutors is that
disciplinary proceedings are not limited to the type of post hoc review of the
prosecution that the Hyde Amendment adopted. A complaint against a
prosecutor can be filed at any time, rather than being restricted to post-trial
proceedings whose objective is to safeguard the profession and the public. An
allegation of an ethical violation could be used as a strategic tool by an
unscrupulous defense counsel seeking to distract the prosecutor from pursuing
a case. The threat of having to defend oneself in a disciplinary proceeding can
have a deterrent effect, regardless of the validity of the alleged violation. For
a federal prosecutor, that problem is compounded by the McDade Act's
requirement that the rules of the state in which the attorney operates, and not
the state in which the person is licensed, govern the conduct at issue. In federal
investigations, actions may be brought in a number ofjurisdictions, potentially
subjecting the prosecutor to multiple disciplinary proceedings.
Beyond the potential use of an ethical complaint as a tactical device, the
rules themselves may be in conflict. What is permissible in one jurisdiction
may be a violation in another. Moreover, the attorney is responsible not only
for her own actions, but also those over whom she has control, such as the
investigatory agents that conduct interviews and engage in undercover
operations. 6 The possibility of a violation, or at least action that could give
rise to a complaint to the disciplinary authorities, is multiplied when the
attorney can be held responsible for the conduct of agents. Of course, there is
nothing wrong with holding an attorney liable for conduct by others, but the
threat to federal prosecutors is magnified given the breadth of certain types of
complex investigtdons.
Perhaps the greatest problem with the McDade Act is the lack of
uniformity in ethical rules for the profession. The rules are a product of the
interaction of different groups, usually consisting of the courts, legislatures, and
bar associations, both national and local. 7 The American Bar Association has
been quite influential in the development of ethical codes through its adoption
of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility and, more recently, the
255. See Henning, supra note 123, at 471-75.
256. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.3(b) (1992) ("[A] lawyer
having direct supervisory authority over the nonlawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure
that the person's conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer.").
257. See STEPHENJ. GILLERS, THE REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND
ETHICs 1-9 (3d ed. 1992).
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Model Rules of Professional Conduct; the American Law Institute has weighed
in with its Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers. However, this process
of divining Platonic ideals is one subject to a certain degree of lobbying and
political pressure.
Can rules be adopted-perhaps the process even manipulated-to provide
defendants with protections that they could not achieve through the legislative
process or have been denied by judicial interpretations of constitutional or
statutory rights? Until 1995, Model Rule 3.8(f)(2) required that a prosecutor not
subpoena a lawyer in a grand jury investigation without receiving prior judicial
approvalY8 While a split existed about whether a state rule could impose such
a duty under the Supremacy Clause, 9 the McDade Act would permit a state
to impose a notification requirement on federal prosecutors even though
Congress had not acted, and a federal court could not impose such a procedure
under its supervisory power. That the ethical rules can be changed to expand
the rights of individuals under the guise of regulating the conduct of lawyers
was demonstrated when the American Bar Association responded to the
Thomburgh Memorandum by expanding the language of Model Rule 4.2 to
prohibit contacts with any represented "person" and not just a "party" to
litigation.2" This expansion of the Model Rule created a means to impede an
investigation by changing the guideline under which the prosecutor must
operate.
It would be odd to have the ethical rules of the profession become the
vehicle for granting rights that are not mandated by the Constitution or adopted
by the legislature; that federal officers would have the rules created by fifty-one
different jurisdictions is perhaps odder still. Not to overstate the case-or to
argue that the process of adopting ethical rules is a captive of special
interests-the problem is that the McDade Act makes no provision for federal
review of the rules, or even a means by which the federal interest can be
represented in the state process. The filing of a complaint with the disciplinary
authorities is very serious business, and the potential for abuse is enough to
raise a question whether the wholesale approach of the McDade Act is the best
method of addressing prosecutorial misconduct. Unfortunately, Congress did
not pause to consider these issues, adopting the provision without the benefit
of much, if any, reflection. The adage "act in haste, repent in leisure" comes to
mind, and one should consider whether the visceral reaction embodied in the
McDade Act will serve the goal of policing prosecutorial misconduct without
also giving defendants a tool to obstruct legitimate law enforcement activities.
258. MODEL RULEs OF PROFEssIONAL CONDUCT RULE 3.8(0(2) (1992).
259. Compare Whitehouse v. United States Dist. Court, 53 F.3d 1349, 1357-59 (1st
Cir. 1995), with Baylson v. Disciplinary Bd., 975 F.2d 102, 111-12 (3d Cir. 1992).
260. See Buettner, supra note 252, at 125 (describing amendment of Model Rule 4.2
by ABA in response to Department of Justice policy on contacts with represented persons).
[Vol. 51: 1
1999] PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN GRAND JURY INVESTIGATIONS 61
V. CONCLUSION
The fact that the prosecutor's conduct in a grand jury falls beyond a federal
court's power of review is the result of the Supreme Court's desire to insulate
the investigatory function of the grand jury. A court cannot consider an
allegation of prosecutorial misconduct without inquiring into the nature and
course of the grand jury's investigation; judicial review of one necessitates
inquiry into the performance of the other. By restricting the supervisory
authority of federal courts to inquire into the grand jury's investigation and
placing it beyond the constitutional limitations on investigations, the Court
makes charges of prosecutorial misconduct unreviewable, at least in the
proceeding in which the alleged misconduct takes place. This construction is
not the result of a mistaken view of the grand jury's role, or a misinterpretation
of the meaning of the Court's decisions. In fact, the Court has made protection
of the grand jury's investigative function, and the concomitant elimination of
judicial review of prosecutorial misconduct, the rationale for its approach to
challenges to the grand jury. Unless the body itself is illegally constituted, its
investigations and accusations are unassailable-not because they are
necessarily right, but because the cost of judicial review would be too great.
Insulating prosecutors' conduct in the grand jury from direct judicial
review does not mean they are, or should be, unaccountable. Prosecutors must
be held accountable, but the best means of reviewing their conduct is outside
the criminal proceeding in which it takes place. Contemporaneous review of a
charge of misconduct can make the entire criminal prosecution depend upon
whether the government's attorney acted properly, and the prosecutor will have
a powerful incentive to protect the charges, perhaps at the cost of being less
than honest about motives. Rather than commingle the criminal charges with
allegations of misconduct, claims of improper action by a prosecutor should be
left to a separate proceeding. The Hyde Amendment and McDade Act take that
approach by trying to provide a means to redress misconduct in a proceeding
that will make the prosecutor's actions the focal point without calling into
question the underlying criminal proceeding. Whether those laws succeed is a
question that will have to be answered over time as courts work through the
flaws inherent in any legislation adopted after only limited congressional
consideration. However, what Congress has done at least begins to address the
gap leftby the Supreme Court and, ultimately, the Constitution, that permits the
grand jury-and prosecutors-virtually unfettered power to investigate
possible criminal activity.
